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Learning amongst Experts and Politicians: An Analysis from Canadian Pension Policy 
By Christopher A. Cooper 
 
 The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario (Haley commission) 
and the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform (Frith committee) were both 
established during the Great Pension Debate (1977-1984) to study the Canadian pension 
system and to develop proposals for reform. Yet despite studying pensions in the same 
country and era, the two inquiries developed fundamentally different solutions. Whereas 
the Haley commission recommended incremental adjustments to programs, the Frith 
committee reframed pensions as an issue intrinsically tied to and perpetuating gender 
biases in society. 
 Using Peter Hall’s systematic process analysis, this thesis finds that the different 
recommendations of these two public inquiries are largely the result of: (a) the varying 
types of information used by the inquiries (specifically expert versus non-expert 
information); and (b) the social learning amongst women’s groups in the period between 
the two inquiries. The combination of an inquiry open to using non-expert information 
alongside an increased number of women’s groups presenting specific proposals for 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The work of commissions of inquiry, both through their hearings and reports, have 
brought new thinking into the public consciousness; expanded the vocabulary of 
politics, education and social science; and added to the furniture that we now expect 
in Canada’s storefront of ideas. [Commissions of inquiry] supplement the traditional 
machinery of government, by bringing to bear the resources of time, objectivity, 
expertise and by offering a forum for the expression of public opinion. 




 Between 1977 and 1984 the viability of the Canadian pension system was in 
question. Years of high inflation, growing government deficits, changing structures of 
gender (i.e. increasing participation of women in the labour force and higher levels of 
divorce), and fears of an impending aging population, led citizens and governments 
across Canada to study the pension system. Of particular concern was the system’s ability 
to protect seniors against abject poverty, and whether the system adequately encouraged, 
and protected, financial contributions from individuals towards their retirement income. 
Federal and provincial governments undertook various policy reviews – ranging 
from departmental reviews to royal commissions – to identify the key problems and 
possible solutions with respect to the pension system in Canada. Yet despite being 
created in reaction to the same events (for example, inflation and government debt), and 
being established in the same country during the same era of debate, the 
recommendations of these various policy reviews were vastly different. This thesis looks 
at the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 
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(hereafter the Haley commission after Chairperson Donna Haley) and the Parliamentary 
Task Force on Pension Reform
1
 (hereafter the Frith committee after Chairperson Douglas 
Frith) established by the Federal government. 
The Haley commission sat for three years and undertook an extensive gathering of 
information through public hearings as well as independent research studies. The 
members of the commission were drawn from outside the government and also had 
professional experience with, and knowledge of, pensions. The final recommendations of 
the Haley commission however, were limited to making adjustments of contemporary 
programs, such as alterations in regulations overseeing the vesting and portability of 
benefits. The core framing of pensions as an issue tied to retirement, and more 
specifically a policy whose primary goals were to provide seniors residual protection 
from poverty and encourage individuals to contribute towards their retirement, was left 
untouched by the commission. 
In contrast, the learning by the Frith committee was innovative and radical. The 
committee challenged the traditional view of pensions as an issue tied to retirement 
income, and reframed the issue as a way of recognizing the economic value of (often 
women’s) domestic labour (Statistics Canada 2012). The committee saw pensions as a 
means to address gender biases in Canada’s economic and social institutions. This was 
accomplished by advocating for a “homemaker pension,” where adults staying in the 
                                                          
1
 Although officially a “parliamentary task force”, this inquiry shared the features of a “parliamentary 
committee” according to Trebilcock’s (1982) classification of policy reviews. First, like parliamentary 
committees, the members of the Frith committee were politicians and not experts outside the government, 
as would be the case of a task force. Secondly, reflecting traits of a parliamentary committee, the Frith 
committee was given a shorter time period to make its report to the government. Thirdly, the Frith 
committee was instructed to review the proposals of a green paper, a unique feature of parliamentary 
committees. Finally during the public hearings members of the inquiry also repeatedly referred to the 
inquiry as a committee and not a task force (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 1: 20). 
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home to conduct work for their spouse, or any dependent individual under the age of 18, 
would accumulate pension benefits within the C/QPP equal to half the Years Maximum 
Pensionable Earnings (YMPE). The committee’s new framing of pensions however, took 
place despite its shorter time period, smaller research staff, and members who were 
politicians.  
The diverse recommendations of these two inquiries are puzzling however, 
considering understandings of public inquiries and Canadian political parties provided 
from the political science literature. Some analysts (for example, Bradford 1998; Jenson 
1994; Inwood 2005) note that the learning produced by royal commissions is generally 
more innovative than other public inquiries such as parliamentary committees. When 
compared with other forms of inquiry, the innovative nature of commissions is seen as 
stemming from their greater human, financial and temporal resources, as well as their 
independence from government.  
Furthermore, according to “brokerage theory” (for example, Carty and Cross 
2010; Meisel 1974; Clarke et al. 1996) politicians wish to appeal to the broadest sectors 
of the electorate. Avoiding radical ideas and seeking moderate positions thus leads to 
incremental recommendations. Yet despite these trends outlined in the literature, the 
opposite outcomes are observed in the Frith committee and the Haley commission.   
Drawing upon works from the policy sciences, cognitive psychology and 
organization theory, this thesis argues that differences in the recommendations of these 
two inquiries are largely the result of two factors: (a) differences in preferences over the 
types of information used to make decisions (specifically expert versus non-expert 
4 
 
information); and (b) the social learning amongst women’s groups in their production and 
dissemination of information, especially proposals for a homemaker pension.  
Due to the increased number of organizations and studies conducting a gendered 
analysis of pensions, when the Frith committee sat just two years after the publication of 
the Haley commission’s report, the positions of women’s groups had grown more 
specific. The increased development of women’s groups combined with the Frith 
committee’s openness to non-expert information, created the conditions that led to a 
radical reframing of pensions as an issue of gender equity. 
 Recognizing the potential of case studies to identify causal mechanisms (George 
and Bennett 2005), this thesis follows the learning process of each inquiry using a 
“systematic process analysis” (SPA) method (Hall 2003). Simply, SPA is a directed 
process tracing that formulates hypotheses to explain causality, and tests these hypotheses 
by following the causal processes as they actually occurred (Hall 2003, 395). 
The findings of this thesis will be of interest to different audiences. This work 
first provides better understanding of how governments learn, by focusing on how 
preferences for different types of information affect what proposals are eventually made. 
This work is also unique by providing a rare glimpse into the actions of a parliamentary 
committee, a public inquiry which has not previously received much attention in 
empirical case studies. To better understand the factors affecting whether incremental 
adjustments or innovative solutions are proposed this thesis also undertakes a rare 
comparison between two public inquiries. This work thus contributes to the debate in the 
public inquiry literature over whether the learning of royal commissions are generally 
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incremental (for example, Ransley 1994; Simeon 1987; Sulzner 1971; Wilson 1971), or 
whether they lead to innovative solutions (for example, Bradford 1998; Inwood 2005; 
Jenson 1994; Berger 2003, 14; Iacobucci 1990, 24; Marchildon 2007). Lastly, this work 
documents how a federal structure can encourage social learning amongst societal groups 
by providing extended opportunities to produce, gather, and discuss issues over a period 
of time in a plurality of venues. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of the 
puzzle and the context of the Great Pension Debate. Situated in the policy learning 
literature, chapter three provides a review on the role of individuals in studying problems 
and developing solutions and also reviews the literature on public inquiries and social 
learning. Chapter four outlines the research design and methodology, while providing a 
brief synopsis of the Canadian pension system. Chapter five describes the structure and 
process of the Haley commission and the Frith committee. Chapter six explores whether 
the experts of the Haley commission and the politicians of the Frith committee sought to 
use different types of information, while chapter seven explores whether the increased 
interest, and body of information held amongst women’s groups towards pensions, 
impacted their capacity to participate in each inquiry. The final chapter offers some 
concluding remarks of the factors affecting the potential of public inquiries to generate 





Chapter Two: The Great Pension Debate 
 
The Great Pension Debate 
The seven years spanning from 1977 to 1984 were an active period in the study of 
pensions in Canada. High inflation, government debt, changing societal structures of 
gender (increasing participation of women in the labour force and high levels of divorce), 
fears of an impending aging population, and poverty amongst seniors, led to growing 
concern over the adequacy of the pension system (Desjardins 1988; Ascah 1984). Due to 
the high level of public, government and academic attention on the issue of pensions 
during this period, this era has since become known as the “Great Pension Debate” 
(Béland and Myles 2005, 252).  
With the viability of the pension system in question, provincial and federal 
governments from across Canada began to search for a policy fix. No less than fourteen 
studies were created in this seven year period (Table 1). These studies spanned from 
intradepartmental reviews such as Alberta’s and Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Labour’s 
Proposal for Improving the Effectiveness of the Private Sector Pension System in Alberta 
and Reform of Canada’s Retirement Income System – A Saskatchewan View to the federal 
government’s interdepartmental steering committee, The Retirement Income System in 
Canada: Problems and Alternatives for Reform, to parliamentary committees such as the 
Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform and the appointment of royal commissions 
such as the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Pensions and the Ontario Royal 
Commissions on the Status of Pensions. 
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Table 1: Provincial and Federal Pension Policy Reviews, 1977-1988 
 
Jurisdiction Year Name 
 
Ontario 1977 The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 
 
Quebec 1977 Comité d'étude sur le financement du régime de rentes du Québec et 
sur les régimes supplémentaires de rentes [Cofirentes +]. “La 
sécurité financière des personnes âgées au Québec.”  
 
Ontario 1979 “Issues in Pension Policy: Economics of Financing National Pension 
Plans: Financing of Public and Private Pension Plans: An Analysis 
From Two Perspectives” 
 
Canada 1979 Task Force on Retirement Income Policy “The Retirement Income 
System in Canada: Problems and Alternatives for Reform” 
 
Canada 1980 Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age Policies “Retirement 
Without Tears” 
 
Sask. 1981 “Reform of Canada’s Retirement Income System – A Saskatchewan 
View” Ministry of Labour 
 
Ontario 1982 Select Committee on Pensions “Report of the Select Committee of 
the Ontario Legislature on Pensions” 
 
BC 1982 “Developing a pension policy for the future” Ministry of Provincial 
Secretary and Government 
 
Canada 1983  Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform 
 
NS 1983  Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Pensions 
 
Man. 1983 Pension Commission of Manitoba. “Proposals for Amendments to 
the Pension Benefits Act” 
 
Ontario 1984 “Ontario Proposals for Pension Reform.” Treasurer of Ontario 
 
Alberta 1984 Proposal for Improving the Effectiveness of the Private Sector  
Pension System in Alberta. Ministry of Labour 
 
Canada 1984 Action Plan for Pension Reform 
 
 
Discussions of pensions by these reviews generally remained within the confines 
of a standard scope. There was a great deal of consensus that pensions were an instrument 
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to prevent poverty amongst seniors, and encourage individuals to contribute to their 
retirement to achieve an adequate replacement income (Béland and Myles 2005, 257). 
Points of disagreement within these reviews commonly included whether inadequacies of 
the present system were better addressed through the expansion of the public system (i.e. 
C/QPP) or by changes in government regulations overseeing private mechanisms 
(Registered Retirement Plans) (Ascah 1984, 416). 
This consensus over the primary functions of pensions during the Great Pension 
Debate reflects the historical legacy of pension policy in Canada (recounted in chapter 
four), as having the dual functions of: (a) ensuring minimum protection against abject 
poverty; and (b) encouraging individuals to contribute to their retirement to achieve an 
adequate level of income replacement.  
 
Reframing core goals – the Frith committee 
While the recommendations of the policy reviews appointed during the Great 
Pension Debate generally emphasized the traditional dual objectives of the pension 
system, the solutions advocated by the Frith committee were remarkably distinct. 
Specifically, the committee deviated from its mandated terms of reference to address 
what it perceived as a novel, but necessary, reframing of pensions as a means to pursue 
gender equality. As the committee stated: 
In carrying out our task we ranged somewhat outside the proposals of the Green Paper. To 
arrive at a coherent set of reform proposals we had to examine broader issues and problems 





 The definition of pensions was reframed by the Frith Committee as an 
institutional structure that both reflected and contributed to gender biases in society. 
Pensions were no longer an issue associated with retirement, but instead became viewed 
as a means to recognize women’s work that has historically been unrecognized in a 
patriarchal market economy. As stated by the committee: 
  
...the problem of pensions for women is not simply a problem of ensuring better pensions 
for  low earners in the labour force. It is a problem of acknowledging and adequately 
providing for the work women do, both inside and outside the labour force, and of 
identifying the institutions and arrangements, including pension arrangements, that must be 
changed in order to make this possible. (emphasis added Frith 1983, 74) 
 
 
Considering that the Frith committee studied the same questions surrounding the 
adequacy of the Canadian pension system, and took place in the same era of national 
debate, its radical reframing of pension policy is intriguing. The innovative solution put 
forth by the Frith committee is all the more perplexing considering the greater resources 
in both time and research capacity held by other policy reviews of the Great Pension 
Debate, and in particular possessed by the Haley commission. 
 
Incremental adjustments – the Haley commission 
 The Haley commission was the most extensive policy review of pensions during 
the Great Pension Debate. It sat for three years, undertook public hearings in eight cities, 
and conducted 13 independent research studies within six different disciplines as well as 
a public opinion survey. The final recommendations of the Haley commission were 
compiled in a comprehensive eight volume report, along with two additional volumes 
containing background papers and independent studies. Unlike the radical 
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recommendations of the Frith committee however, the recommendations of the Haley 
commission were limited to incremental solutions to existing policy instruments 
(summarized in Table 2). These included alterations in the regulations overseeing the 
vesting and portability of benefits, minimum survivor benefits for the widowed, as well 
as minimum employee and employer contribution levels.   
 The Haley commission’s reflection of the standard approach to pensions is best 
exemplified in its recommendation for the establishment of a provincially run, 
mandatory, defined-contribution plan with immediate vesting and complete portability, 
under the name of the Provincial Universal Retirement System (PURS). In short, the 
Haley commission explicitly reaffirmed the traditional policy goals of pensions to protect 
against abject poverty and encourage individuals to contribute for their retirement.  
 
Table 2: Key Recommendations of the Haley and Frith Inquiry 
 
 Solution 
Frith Committee Homemaker Pension: C/QPP 
contributions equal to half the years 
maximum pensionable earnings 
  
Haley Commission Resist attempts to increase universal 
Benefits of OAS. 
 
Provincially administered DC plan 
  
 Speaking to the objectives of pension policy, the commission perfectly mirrors the 




In concluding that Ontario should seek a system of retirement income provision for its 
residents the Commission believes that government should design social programs to 
achieve two goals: 
 
- to guarantee a minimum level of retirement income below which no person`s income is 
permitted to fall; 
 
- to replace a measure of pre-retirement earnings in retirement. 
 
A system designed to meet these objectives need not and should not deny the responsibility 
of the individual to use his or her own best efforts to provide for the retirement years…The 
Commission sees a positive social value in preserving and, where possible, enlarging the 
area of individual discretion for retirement. Accordingly, it is desirable that government 
use its power to extend certain incentives and opportunities for individuals to save and 
thereby allow them to take responsibility for part of their post-retirement living standard. 
(Haley 1980, Volume X, 2)  
 
 Importantly, the incremental nature of the commission’s recommendations cannot 
be attributed to it being assigned a limited mandate. As noted by others (Desjardins 1988, 
140; Baldwin 1981), the commission was given a broad mandate to study the Canadian 
pension system in any way it deemed appropriate to uncover the most pressing 
inadequacies in the social and economic components of the Canadian pension system. 
Ontario Premier William G. Davis told the commission at its establishment: 
pensions involve social, political and economic issues which are as complex as they are 
significant. The importance and complexity of the issues involved require the 
establishment of a commission. (Haley 1980, Volume I, xi) 
 
 The broad and sweeping statement to study “social and economic aspects” has 
also been found in other public inquiries in Canada such as the Mackenzie Pipeline 
Inquiry (also called the Berger inquiry) told to consider the “social, environmental, and 
economic impact regionally of the construction, operation, and subsequent abandonment 
of the proposed pipeline” (Berger 1986: 93; as cited in Althaus 1994, 191).  
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 Differences in the nature of the recommendations advanced by the Haley and 
Frith inquiries are even more perplexing considering works frequently linking 
commissions and experts to innovative learning due to their operations outside of 
government and bureaucratic routines, as well as their larger resources to conduct 
research and hold public consultations (for example, Jenson 1994; Bradford 1998; 
Inwood 2005). Conversely, due to their closer relationships with government and lack of 
resources, parliamentary committees and politicians have been associated with 
incremental learning (Wilson 1971; Jenson 1994; Marchildon 2007; Hodgetts 1968).  
 
Conclusion 
 Between 1977 and 1984, governments across Canada reacted to growing concerns 
over the ability of the pension system to protect seniors against poverty and encourage 
individuals to adequately contribute to their retirement, by establishing policy reviews to 
study the pension system and recommend solutions. 
The parameters of these reviews generally reflected the traditional goals 
embedded in Canadian pension policy. Such was the case for the Haley commission, 
whose members were experts drawn from outside government, and had been given 
extensive resources to conduct public hearings and independent research over a period of 
three years.  
Developing a radically new approach to pensions however, was the Frith 
committee. Despite being exclusively composed of politicians, having a smaller research 
capacity and sitting for a shorter period of time than the Haley commission, the Frith 
13 
 
committee reframed the core goals and problems associated with pensions as an issue 
related to gender equality. 
Differences between the recommendations of the two inquiries are puzzling 
however, as understandings of politicians and experts as well as parliamentary 
committees and royal commissions generally point to different learning outcomes. To 
better understand why the recommendations of these two inquiries are so different, the 
next chapter provides an overview of the public inquiry literature focusing on how such 
bodies study problems, as well as theoretical distinctions between how experts and 














Chapter Three: Literature Review Learning by Individuals and Policy Reviews 
 
What is policy learning? 
 In Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, Hugh Heclo (1974) first 
provided an alternative interpretation for the development of policy. No longer was 
policy exclusively viewed as a product of political struggles; rather, policy was depicted 
as an outcome of collective problem-solving. In the words of Heclo, “governments not 
only ‘power’...they also puzzle” (1974, 305). Alongside increased recognition in the use 
of information in the development of policy, a body of literature has since developed 
under the rubric of “policy learning”. Interested in how governments use information and 
knowledge to solve problems and develop policy (Dunlop and James 2007, 406), policy 
learning continues to receive academic attention. 
 Alongside such interest however, discontent has also grown over the literature’s 
lack of theoretical progress (Crossan et al. 1999; Oliver and Lodge 2003), and inability to 
specify how learning takes place (Radaelli 2009; Zito and Schout 2009). Such 
frustrations grow in part from research failing to define learning (for example, Bray et al. 
2011), as well as differences in terminology. Terms used include: “lesson drawing” (Rose 
1991); “policy-oriented learning” (Sabatier 1988); and “government learning” (Etheredge 
and Short 1983). Furthermore, at a rudimentary level, contention also exists over what 
exactly learning is. Huber (1991) and Nilsson (2006, 229), maintain that policy learning 
does not require policy change; instead, learning requires the use of information in 
decision-making, even if the end result is the maintenance of the status quo. Others 
however, hold that learning only occurs when such information is used to actually change 
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policy (Bennett and Howlett 1992). In explaining variation between the Haley 
commission and the Frith committee, this thesis defines learning as the use of new 
information in making a decision and not necessarily a decision leading to policy change. 
Consequently, as ad hoc bodies initiated by governments to study problems and develop 
solutions, public inquiries, such as royal commissions and parliamentary committees, are 
fait accompli, an example of policy learning. Accordingly, studying public inquiries 
automatically allows researchers to go beyond determining whether learning occurs, and 
instead begins from a position focusing on how learning takes place. 
Nonetheless, some general agreement does exist in the learning literature. For 
instance, a frequent distinction is often made between ‘incremental’ and ‘radical’ learning 
(for example, Argyris and Schon 1978; March 1991; May 1992). Incremental learning is 
generally defined as minor adjustments to policy instruments, while radical learning is 
defined as axiomatic changes in the core policy goals and problem definitions 
themselves.  
Concurring with the distinction between incremental and radical forms of 
learning, a more specific division is provided by Peter A. Hall (1993), who further 
distinguishes between two degrees of incremental learning. The most incremental form of 
learning, called “first order change” is a refinement in the degree to which present 
programs are implemented. The second form of incremental change, (“second order” 
change), is an alteration of the policy instruments used to achieve policy goals (1993, 
281-283). Standing in contrast to incremental learning is radical learning (“third order” 
change) where the core goals and problem definitions of policy are reframed. 
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Due to the inability of policy learning to specify causal relationships, it is instead 
better to use policy learning as an approach emphasizing the role of knowledge in the 
development of policy. Policy learning could then be complemented with other theories 
and models to explain the relationship between knowledge and the development of 
policy. This thesis does such, by developing an ideal typology exploring whether 
different actors solve problems in different ways. 
 
How individuals learn 
 For some, learning is an action exclusive to individuals (Levy 1994; Mahler 
1997). For these methodological individualists, the literature follows the salient streams 
of thought within decision-making studies: the rational individual and the individual of 
bounded-rationality.   
Also called Bayesian learning, rational learning studies view learning as a process 
of updating beliefs, where knowledge is understood in terms of probabilities that the 
information believed to be true is empirically accurate (Dobbin et al. 2007, 460). 
Although rational accounts of learning assume that all individuals adhere to the principles 
of internal consistency and utility maximization, this does not necessitate that all actors 
move together towards the same policies. Gilardi (2010, 651) for instance, shows that 
when different individuals update their beliefs from the same new information, their 
actions vary depending on the nature of the perennial beliefs being updated. In other 
words, where we come from determines where we are going. 
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Others believe that the cognitive and psychological limitations of humans are too 
salient to be ignored. For these proponents of bounded rationality, learning is not solely 
based on increased accuracy of new information; rather, because  humans rely on routines 
and heuristics to overcome limitations in gathering and analyzing information, learning 
also entails improvements in the routines and heuristics themselves (for example, 
Busenberg 2001; Weyland 2005).  
Cognitive psychology also looks at how individuals’ perennial beliefs and 
heuristics affect the way they interpret information. It is theorized that when presented 
with new information individuals inescapably use “mental models” (Johnson-Laird 1983; 
Held et al. 2006) to interpret new information. Simply put, a mental model is a 
conceptualization of any phenomenon. How mental models are constructed is a function 
of past understandings of the world. The educational training and professional 
environments of individuals have been noted as key factors determining the mental 
models of individuals (Seel 2006). 
Organization theory also recognizes the link between one’s professional and 
educational background and how problems are solved. The likelihood of individual actors 
possessing similar educational background and working in the same organization 
approaching problems with the same “logic of appropriateness” (March 1994), is a 
recognized problem facing organizations especially in times when innovation is required. 
One solution to the above is to incorporate new persons with different backgrounds into 
the organization in hopes of distilling fresh ideas (March 1991).  
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Others distinguish amongst ways different decision-makers solve problems. 
Velblen (as cited in Merton 1957) speaks of the “trained incapacity” developed by civil 
servants from relying on organizational routines when solving problems which generally 
result in minor adjustments to current policies and programs (also see Downs 1967). 
Petchey et al. (2008) and Vigoda (2002) however, argue that street-level bureaucrats in 
touch with citizens’ realities use flexibility in implementing regulations in more 
innovative ways, while Bradford (2003) claims that the ability of these bureaucrats to 
voice the opinions of the citizen’s results in new ideas.  
Two other important actors in the policy process are experts and politicians. 
While differences exist over what constitutes an expert (for example, Turner 2001), one 
definition used here is that experts possess specific cognitive (knowledge about a 
subject), technical (the skills to analyze and make sense of information), and social 
dimensions (recognition of their expertise) (Collins and Evans 2002; Fischer 1999). 
Frequently, experts attain all three dimensions through their educational background and 
the eventual practice within their field (Collins and Evans 2002). In this manner, 
politicians could not be experts of a specific field, unless they possessed the relevant 
cognitive, technical and social dimensions.
2
  
Expert knowledge is therefore defined as information generated according to 
professional standards by individuals recognized as experts (van Kerkhoff and Lebel 
2006 as cited in Weible 2008). Therefore, while expertise is discipline-specific, a policy 
issue may involve more than one discipline. For instance, while only an economist can be 
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 For a discussion of the ways politicians are experts see Marier 2008. See Fischer 1999, for a discussion of 




considered an expert in economics, with regards to pension policy, economists, lawyers, 
accountants and actuaries are all relevant experts.  
Due to their specific educational background and professional experience, it is 
here theorized that experts have a unique way of approaching problems and making 
decisions. Several researchers note that experts analyze information according to the 
standards of their disciplines (for example, Hirschman 1970; Radaelli 2005; Garvin 
2001). Garvin (2001) holds that these “analytical paradigms”, by which actors interpret 
information, are developed through their educational and professional background. 
Furthermore, when experts make decisions they generally focus on probabilities of 
outcomes as determined by scientific methods.  
Differences between experts and other actors such as politicians are also noted by 
those studying the technocratization of policy (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). Again, 
stemming from their different professional and educational backgrounds, experts are 
depicted as focusing on information adhering to scientifically recognized methods, at the 
expense of information generated from the public (for example, Jasanoff and Wynne 
1998; Mody and Kaiser 2008; Skogstad 2010). Fischer (1999, 299), notes that such 
methods are predominantly used to generate universal laws at the expense of more 
contextually-based information such as that based on personal experiences. This can 
result in generalizing problems, while ignoring the contextual uniqueness of any given 
situation (see Garvin 2001, 450). 
Works have also theorized over how politicians solve problems. According to 
Garvin (2001) politicians live in a world where objective and scientific information may 
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explain why something is, but cannot prescribe what policy actions should actually be 
made. Politicians are also more likely to consider any social and political consequences 
of decisions that scientific information may not make obvious (Garvin 2001, 452). This 
idea is also supported by Marier (2008, 518) who notes that politicians will equally focus 
on the technical ‘programmatic’ side of problems (i.e. answers provided by evidence) as 
well as the ‘political’ component concerning judgments over social values (i.e. answers 
wrapped up in considerations of ‘justice’, and the ‘public will’) (also see, Majone 1989). 
The political components of problems may not be greatly aided by the production of 
scientific information, but instead may be better understood through the use of non-
scientific information such as anecdote or tacit knowledge from the lived experience of 
individuals (Dobell and Zussman 1981). 
A view of the politician is also provided through Radaelli’s “logics of action” 
(2005). Here, politicians seek to mediate problems amongst the citizenry through the 
negotiation of opposing positions. Therefore, while Garvin sees politicians as making 
decisions in consideration of social judgments, Radaelli concurs, but sees the basis of 
these judgments as mediated positions amongst opposing interests.  
Radaelli’s model of problem-solving by politicians also reflects the general 
principles of the “brokerage theory” within the Canadian political science literature (for 
example, Carty and Cross 2010; Meisel 1974; Clarke et al. 1996), which holds that 
politicians strive to develop solutions with the broadest base of public support. Finding 
the middle ground amongst opposing interests often leads to the elimination of drastic 
solutions, and the types of solutions developed are thus often close to the status quo. 
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These preferences for different types of information have been supported through 
empirical works studying royal commissions. Bulmer’s (1981) review of public inquiries 
notes that the use of information by such bodies is increasingly one of public information 
versus expert research. One either uses information gathered from the public or one uses 
expert research studies. Furthermore, Bulmer maintains the background of the 
commissioners is an important factor determining what types of information are used 
(1981, 359). 
Recent work from Canada has also documented how preferences for specific 
types of information can impact final recommendations. In her analysis of the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Scala (2008, 109-111), describes how 
the preference for evidence-based information of commissioner Patricia Braid, an expert 
in medical genetics, in part led to the marginalization of alternative sources including 
information gathered through public hearings. Furthermore, in his analysis of the 
Macdonald commission, Inwood (2005) found that commissioners with greater expertise 
were more interested in technical evidence, and skeptical of information produced 
through public consultations, which they viewed as being politically skewed.  
 
The role of policy reviews in learning 
In The Choice of Governing Instrument, Trebilcock et al. (1982), use the term 
“public inquiry” to describe government forums of investigation, such as royal 
commissions, tasks forces, parliamentary committees and departmental reviews. 
However, in this thesis I use the term “policy review” to refer to government initiated 
bodies studying an issue and developing solutions, while the term “public inquiry” is 
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used to refer to government initiated bodies studying an issue and developing solutions 
that involve the public through hearings and submissions. 
Functions common to all public inquiries are the ability of governments to 
demonstrate their concern for an issue without having to take any further actions in the 
near future (Trebilcock et al. 1982); develop consensus amongst opposing interests; and 
inform the public (Trebilcock et al. 1982). Most important of all however, is that all 
public inquiries study problems and develop solutions. In this manner, the various 
motives of governments behind the establishment of an inquiry does not detract from the 
latters’ function to solve problems (Marier 2009, 1206-1207). 
Some scholars argue that differences amongst policy reviews are too great to 
warrant generalizations amongst types (Chapman 1973; Stutz 2008; Prasser 1994). 
Others however, rightly maintain that significant differences in the structure of policy 
reviews do exist, which can have an important impact on the character of their final 
recommendations.
3
 Of particular interest are distinctions made between royal 
commissions and parliamentary committees. 
 
Royal commissions 
Within the public inquiry literature, royal commissions are the most frequently 
examined. Royal commissions are commonly distinguished by their legal enactment as an 
ad hoc body without previous organizational routines. At the federal level, commissions 
are enacted through the Federal Inquiries Act, while similar legislation also exists at the 
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 Trebilcock et al. (1982) identify five types of policy reviews; royal commissions, task forces, 
parliamentary committees, departmental studies, and advisory agencies. 
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provincial level (Centa and Macklem 2003, 88). Royal commissions are also noted for 
their independence from the government, their capacity to conduct independent research, 
their longer time period to study issues, as well as their inclusion of the public through 
hearings and submissions (Trebilcock et al. 1982). Another defining feature of 
commissions is the frequent appointment of experts from outside government to sit as 
commissioners. The autonomy which royal commissions possess is demonstrated by their 
frequency to work beyond their mandated time periods and their terms of reference 
(Centa and Macklem 2003; Chapman 1973, 179; D'Ombrain 1997; Drache and Cameron 
1985; Jenson 1994). 
Focusing on the work of royal commissions in Canada, and noting their attributes 
outlined above, some claim that these bodies possess the capacity to generate innovative 
ideas (Centa and Macklem 2003; Jenson 1994; Timpson 2003; D'Ombrain 1997; 
Iacobucci 1990; Marchildon 2007; Inwood 2005; Gosnell 1934; Berger 2003, 14). For 
instance, Neil Bradford (1994; 1998) claims that royal commissions have been the 
predominate institution generating novel policy ideas in Canada. A review of the 
Canadian literature identifies no less than nine royal commissions associated with 
fundamental shifts in how issues are conceived and problems defined.
4
 
One characteristic of royal commissions associated with the generation of 
innovative ideas is their public dimension. Expanding the range of actors participating in 
                                                          
4
   These Commissions are the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois 
Commission); Ontario Royal Commission on Worker’s Compensation (Meredith Commission); Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline Inquiry (although a task force it is generally treated as a commission); Royal Commission 
on Canada's Economic Prospects (Gordon Commission); Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada (MacDonald Commission); Royal Commission on National 
Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission); Royal Commission on Taxation 
(Carter Commission); Royal Commission on Health Services (Hall Commission); Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Dunton and Laurendeau Commission). 
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policy deliberations allows alternative ideas to challenge the status quo (Inwood 2005, 
47; Jenson 1994; Phillips 1994; Salter 2007). Royal commissions thus provide a “window 
of opportunity” (Kingdon 2011) for new actors to reframe the nature of issues and present 
new policies and programs. For example, Timpson (2003) claims that Commissioner Bird 
(a journalist for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) of the Royal Commission of the 
Status of Women, encouraged women appearing before the commission to draw upon 
their lived experiences. The new information relayed in these narratives led to a shift in 
the discussions of the commission from the direction it was established to take. 
Yet not all research agrees that royal commissions possess a potential for 
innovative learning. In his analysis of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada (the Macdonald commission), Simeon (1987) claims 
that being created by governments and made up of elites, commissions develop 
incremental solutions. Simeon’s claim however is based upon his one observation of the 
Macdonald commission. Others, such as Salter (1990) have therefore rightly criticized 
Simeon, noting that royal commissions instead contain a potential for radical learning, 
but a potential that they often fail to realize (1990, 181-182).  
According to Salter (2007) one factor explaining the innovative potential of 
public inquiries is their different conceptions of the public. While all inquiries formally 
involve the public, important differences exist in how they conceptualize the public and 
incorporate their views. Salter proposes six
5
 different notions of the public, each 
fundamentally affecting the way information from the public is used. 
                                                          
5
 These are: public as interest groups, public as disaffected, public as about discourse, public as expert, 
public as non-expert-layperson, and public as public opinion. 
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Three of the most distinct conceptions Salter outlines are “public as expert,” 
“public as non-expert” and “public as public opinion”. Inquiries viewing the public as 
non-expert are likely to use information generated by experts, while also using the 
inquiry as a means to educate society. Where the public is viewed as being experts, 
information from the public is considered to be relevant in understanding issues and can 
therefore influence the final recommendations (best exemplified by the Berger inquiry 
see Salter 2007). When inquiries view the public as public opinion however, the public is 
not seen as providing important insight into issues but instead, public information is seen 
as merely indicating the general preferences of society. 
Another possible factor explaining the potential of public inquiries to incorporate 
public information or generate innovative learning is the character of the ideas 
themselves and their familiarity amongst the policy community (consisting of politicians, 
civil servants, and other interested actors). According to Kingdon (2011, 127), there is a 
great deal of resistance to new ideas and prior to the acceptance of a new idea, there must 
be a degree of “softening up” amongst the policy community over time (also see Frantz 
and Sato 2005; Mätzke and Ostner 2010). 
Kingdon’s insight into the temporal dimension of ideas is important, yet too much 
emphasis on the substance of an idea overlooks other important dimensions. The 
recipient of the idea may affect the success of an idea more than its character. For 
example, experts may be more open to an idea outlining mechanisms of programs 
expressed in scientific language, whereas politicians may be less concerned about 
program details and more open to information based upon non-scientific methods. 
Kingdon is therefore partially correct when he states that the technical feasibility of an 
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idea explains its viability, but his claim requires a qualification that the technical 
feasibility of an idea may be more important for some actors than others.  
 Providing an impetus for groups to participate in policy, some scholars claim that 
measuring the influence of public inquiries solely by their final recommendations is 
restricted (for example, Scala 2002, 37). Instead, it is maintained that to better measure 
the complete influence of a public inquiry considerations should be given to the ‘social 
learning’ (Jenson 1994) taking place amongst members of society participating in the 
public inquiry. 
 Just as it is possible to speak of learning within an individual, or within the larger 
collectivity of an organization such as a public inquiry, it is also possible to conceptualize 
learning amongst larger networks of actors (such as women’s or seniors groups).  Using 
past experience and information to analyze issues, social learning is defined as the use of 
knowledge amongst actors within society to develop positions on policy (Knoepfel and 
Kissling-Naf 1998). By bringing attention to an issue and providing an opportunity to 
participate, public inquiries can encourage groups to reflect upon issues and develop 
policy positions. Therefore, in cases where the participation of specific groups was not 
reflected in the recommendations of a particular public inquiry, the opportunity to 
participate in the inquiry has nonetheless been noted as leading to social learning for 





Parliamentary committees are another form of public inquiry. While less studied 
than royal commissions, parliamentary committees have been theorized as less likely to 
generate innovative learning than royal commissions (Wilson 1971; Marchildon 2007; 
Hodgetts 1968).
6
 One important characteristic of parliamentary committees is that their 
members are exclusively politicians (Trebilcock et al. 1982), which has been noted to 
constrain their ability to develop novel solutions (Aucoin 1990). Even if not towing the 
party line, politicians are likely to sympathize with the policies and programs proposed 
by their party (Courtney 1969). 
Stemming from their shorter time period and limited research resources, another 
limiting characteristic of parliamentary committees is their inability to develop extensive 
searches for alternative solutions. Parliamentary committees can however conduct public 
hearings, but again, the scope of these is generally smaller than those of royal 
commissions (Trebilcock et al. 1982). Parliamentary committees also have more specific 
mandates than royal commissions. In some cases, the mandate may be to review a 
prospective bill after its second reading, and in such cases the recommendations put forth 
are normally incremental (Mills 1994). A committee can also be given a broader mandate 
to review the proposals set out in a government Green or White Paper (Trebilcock et al. 
1982), but even in these situations, the mandated scope of issues which parliamentary 
committees study is more focused than the broad mandates given to commissions. For all 
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 Two types of parliamentary committees exist: standing parliamentary committees, whose duration is 
indefinite, and select committees, which are temporary and ad hoc. Subsequent mention of parliamentary 
committees referrers exclusively to select committees. 
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of these reasons, parliamentary committees have been categorized as developing more 
incremental recommendations than those proposed by royal commissions.  
 
Conclusion 
 In light of the above review, learning is defined as the use of information in 
developing solutions to identified problems. As such, the recommendations in the final 
reports of policy reviews are an example of this definition of learning. To remain 
coherent with the broader literature, this thesis uses Hall’s distinction between three 
degrees of learning. Examples, of the three degrees in pension policy could include; for 
first order change (degree of implementation), altering the period of time before benefits 
are vested; for second degree learning (policy instruments), developing a new public 
pension plan program to encourage savings; and for third degree learning (goals and 
problem definitions) moving beyond viewing pensions as an instrument associated with 
income security in retirement. For example, pensions could be viewed as a means to 
remedy the patriarchal biases towards women in society (for example, Collins 1978). 
 Not all actors learn in the same manner however, and important differences may 
exist between how experts and politicians solve problems, specifically in regards to the 
criteria used to judge information. Such differences can be expected to manifest 
themselves in the outcomes of public inquiries.  
Through a review of the literature studying royal commissions and parliamentary 
committees, the former has been noted for its larger research capacity, including public 
consultation and independent research, longer time period of study and membership 
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drawn from outside the government. Noting the greater independence from the 
government and assortment of resources, some have noted that the recommendations of 
commissions can generate innovative ideas. Furthermore, although rarely studied in 
empirical case studies, parliamentary committees are often associated with incremental 
learning. The cases of this thesis however, point in the opposite direction. This thesis thus 
seeks to better understand why some public inquiries lead to innovative recommendations 
while others put forth incremental adjustments. The next chapter outlines the research 













Chapter Four: Research Design, Methods and Pension Policy in Canada 
Methodological debates and the Systematic Process Analysis  
 Within the social sciences a clear debate has persisted over the best method to 
study causal relationships. While frequently cast in terms of qualitative versus 
quantitative studies, this description of the debate does not capture a more fundamental 
epistemological divide. Instead, it is better to distinguish between ‘correlational-
deductivists’ (for example, King et al. 1994; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Popper 1970) 
on one hand, and ‘mechanism-inductivists’ (for example, Tarrow 2004; George and 
Bennett 2005) on the other hand. For correlational-deductivists, understanding causality 
is attained when observations match expected outcomes as hypothesized according to 
theories (McKeown 1999, 163). For example, if theory ‘A’ is correct, then when X has a 
value of Xi, Y will have a value of Yi).  
For mechanism-inductivists however, causal relationships are understood by 
identifying the causal mechanisms of phenomenon. This is done by tracing processes of 
how one, or a conjuncture, of variables, impacts the outcome under study. Noting the 
respective merits of both the correlational-deductivists and the mechanism-inductivists, a 
group of scholars have called for bridging the two sides in a “mixed-method approach” 
(for example, Lieberman 2005). 
This work uses Peter A. Hall’s “systematic process analysis” (SPA) (Hall 2003) 
to explain the different recommendations of the Haley commission and the Frith 
committee. As a mixed-method approach, SPA is both correlational-deductivist, 
(beginning with theory and hypothesizing expected outcomes), and mechanism-
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inductivist (testing these hypotheses by tracing how causal mechanisms actually unfold. 
According to Hall, the goal of SPA is not to provide a comprehensive account of every 
factor explaining the outcome under study, but instead to focus on what is likely a few of 
the most important variables to better understand the phenomenon understudy (2008, 
306).  
 Apart from their express designation to study issues and identify solutions, public 
inquiries are an excellent opportunity to study how learning takes place due to their 
public record. This thesis therefore uses several different sources to trace how issues were 
addressed and decisions were made. These sources include: the inquiries’ final reports 
and background documents, transcripts and recordings of the public hearings, public 
submissions, primary media coverage, as well as secondary sources written by observers 
and participants of the two inquiries. Data was primarily collected through the Ontario 
Archives in Toronto, and various university libraries throughout Canada. Before 
presenting the cases, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the pension system in 
Canada. 
 
The policy core of Canadian pension policy  
Within every policy issue it is possible to speak of an embedded policy core. This 
core is defined as the axiomatic principles that provide understanding and meaning for a 
particular issue. While a reality can be said to exist, there is also an inherent subjectivity 
in the way humans make sense of their world. What components of reality become the 




Insight into this “struggle over meaning” (McKeen 2001, 38) has been used by 
scholars to understand how different framings of issues affect the design of policy 
(Bacchi 1999; Schneider and Ingram 1993). Following methods from policy framing 
(Schmidt 2002), the policy core of pensions is identified by distinguishing between the 
objectives of the policy, the problem definitions, and those solutions best able to address 
such problems.  
 
History of the Canadian pension system 
 The history of pensions in Canada does not vary greatly from the history of social 
welfare. From the first settlements, until the time of the First World War, there was little 
state-provided welfare. A strong belief in the responsibility of the individual to provide 
for his or herself was the norm, and any financial hardship encountered were seen as 
stemming from a degenerate and idle character. Private charity and family were the 
primary avenues for to someone in need, after which government run poorhouses were 
the last refuge (Dennis 1999). This was frequently the case of older persons when they 
could no longer work or became viewed by their employers as unproductive (Gee and 
McDonald 1991). For these reasons, Canada has been noted as a “liberal welfare regime” 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Béland and Shinkawa 2007). 
 The first government pension policy – the Canadian Government Annuities Act of 
1908 (Morton and McCallum 1988) – reflected the belief in individual responsibility by 
encouraging persons to purchase a life annuity. The idea of a state operated pension 
however remained antithetical to the liberal foundation of the Canadian welfare state. As 
then Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated in 1907: 
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To ask purely and simply that there should be an old age pension whether a man has been 
thrifty or the reverse, whether he has been sober or not, whether he has been a good citizen 
or a bad citizen, is going farther than I would be disposed to go (as cited in Morton and 
McCallum 1988, 9).  
 
 Partly due to the establishment of the Civil Service Pension and Soldier Insurance 
program, greater acceptance for government involvement in providing welfare began to 
emerge in late 1920s (Orloff 1993). However, the distinction between the deserving and 
undeserving poor remained, and the Old Age Pensions Act of 1927 was limited to a 
residual benefit for those persons able to demonstrate their need through means-testing 
(Bryden 1974).  
 Things changed at the end of the Second World War, with the belief that all 
seniors should be protected against the perils of destitute poverty. The Old Age Security 
Act (OAS) replaced the Old Age Pensions Act of 1927, which now provided persons 70 
years and older a minimum benefit without means-testing. The benefit was deliberately 
low however, so as to not detract from the responsibility of the individual (National 
Union 2007). To further protect against poverty, the OAS was complemented with the 
introduction in 1967 of the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS).  
 In 1966 a major change occurred with the establishment of the Canada Pension 
Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). The C/QPP was designed as a 
mandatory earnings-related Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) public plan, with contributions 
from employers and employees. However, in contrast to other countries where the 
average replacement ratio of a mandatory public pension system can be 50% (Marier 
2010, 6), in Canada the public component deliberately provided a low replacement level.  
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 According to Gee and McDonald (1991), the low replacement levels of the OAS 
and the CPP was again a reflection of the preference for individual’s to retain 
responsibility in overseeing their retirement income. In fact, according to Allan 
MacEachen – the Minister of National Health and Welfare who oversaw the introduction 
of the CPP – the low replacement ratio of the public pension arrangements was 
intentional to encourage growth of private sector pensions (stated by Monique Bégin, 
Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 1:21). The policy core for pensions and its corresponding 
policy instruments are outlined below in Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
Table 3: Pension Policy Core in Canada, 1926-1977 
Policy Goal Avoid abject poverty and encourage 
individuals to secure an adequate 
replacement ratio. 
 
Problem Definition Economic and administrative threats to 
individual’s saving. 
 
Legitimate Actors Government: minimum protection against 
abject poverty; encourage and protect 
personal savings. 













Table 4: Pension Policy Goals and Corresponding Programs 
Policy Objective* Policy Instrument 
 
Incentives for Individual Savings 
 
RRSP, Private Pension Regulations.  
 
Protect Private Savings 
 
RRP Regulations.  
Reduce Poverty OAS, GIS. 
 
*Other policy objectives have been noted within the literature (See Béland 2006 for a discussions of 
encouraging provincial economies; McDaniel 1997 for a discussion of intergenerational transfers; 
Simeon 1972, 257 for income redistribution). Nonetheless pensions have not been thought of as a 
policy associated with gender equity.  
 
Conclusion 
Historically, the pension system in Canada has had two main objectives. The first 
has been to ensure protection for the elderly against poverty, and the second has been to 
encourage individuals to contribute to their retirement and achieve an adequate income in 
retirement.  
Beginning in the 1970s however, changing economic and demographic 
circumstances, brought into question the ability of the pension system to successfully 
realize these two objectives. The next chapter looks at the formation, structure and 
recommendations of two public inquiries appointed to study the Canadian pension system 






Chapter Five: The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario and the 
Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform 
 
The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 
On April 20, 1977, amidst growing public concern over the inadequacy of the 
pension system in Canada, the Ontario Progressive Conservative government of Premier 
William G. Davis established what would be the most extensive public inquiry during the 
Great Pension Debate (Haley 1980, Volume I, x). The timing of the Royal Commission 
on the Status of Pensions in Ontario (the Haley commission) is consistent with studies 
examining the political functions of public inquiries (Sulzner 1971; Wilson, 1971; 
Trebilcock et al. 1982). Less than two weeks after the appointment of the commission, 
Davis’ government would be dissolved on a vote of non-confidence, and 50 days after the 
announcement of the commission, Ontarians would go to the polls and re-elect Davis for 
the third consecutive time (Whitcomb 2007, 70). Not wanting to take a position that 
could upset the electorate, yet desiring to do something, the establishment of the Haley 
commission thus allowed Davis to signal his concern for pensions in a politically safe 
manner.  
Another reason for the appointment of the commission was to develop consensus 
amongst opposing interests, specifically between business, labour and retirees. As is 
frequently the case of commissions attempting to resolve conflicts (Trebilcock et al. 
1982), the five members appointed to the commission included representatives from these 
interested groups (Haley 1980, Volume I, vii). 
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Donna Haley, a lawyer who had sat as the Chair of the Pension Commission of 
Ontario for the previous three years, was appointed Chairperson. Alongside Haley, four 
other commissioners were appointed: Donald Coxe, a lawyer and vice-president of an 
investment firm as well as former member of the Canada Pension Plan Advisory 
Committee; Alfred Cordell, a chartered accountant and former chief finical officer of a 
large corporation, as well as a member of the Financial Executives Institute on Pensions; 
Charles McDonald, president of the National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation, 
and past Director of the Retired Workers and Community Service department of the 
United Auto Workers Union; and Walter Upshall, owner of an investment business, 
former credit manager of a major corporation, and member of the Ontario Advisory 
Council of Senior Citizens (Haley 1980, Volume X, v). 
Despite including individuals representing interests from business, labour and the 
retired, these commission members also all shared a familiarity with the Canadian 
pension system. In the words of the commission “[i]ts members also brought to bear 
certain relevant financial, legal and social skills. This combination of experience and 
perspective was indispensable to the Commission’s understanding of pension issues” 
(Haley 1980, Volume I, vii). In short, the appointment of members professionally 
involved in the practice of pensions, created a commission whose membership was 
knowledgeable of pension policy.  
Noting the connection between pensions and the economy as well as other public 
policies (Haley 1980, Volume I, xi), Premier Davis gave the commission a broad 
mandate in three points: 
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1. To study the impact on the economy of different systems of financing retirement pension 
plans and arrangements including Ontario's financing and investment role in the Canadian 
Pension Plan. 
2. To examine the terms and conditions of existing retirement pension plans and 
arrangements, to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of present social and economic 
circumstances, and to study the interrelationships among the private sector plans, the 
Canadian Pension Plan, and employee pension plans. 
3. To make such recommendations in relation to the above as the Commission deems 
appropriate. (Haley 1980, Volume I, vi) 
 
 The second and third points were particularly wide-ranging, and allowed the 
commission to establish its own direction. As the commission prepared to gather 
information, it first sought an “analytical framework” (Haley 1980, Volume I, xi) through 
which to guide its analysis; eventually deciding to look beyond pensions and examine the 
broader concept of retirement as a whole. 
To direct its analysis of retirement, the commission further decided upon 
examining the actions of individuals, government and employers towards retirement 
(Haley 1980). The commission also sought to judge proposals for reform on empirical 
evidence with a specific focus on their costs and benefits (Haley 1980, Volume 1, 6), thus 
privileging the place of such analysis in the work of the commission. 
 The desire for empirical evidence reflects a trend of royal commissions since the 
Second World War to use social science in its investigations (Bulmer 1981). This 
research was conducted by its own permanent research staff and independent researchers 
contracted by the commission. Research assistance was also received from various 
government bodies, including federal and provincial ministries and agencies, and 
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professionals from the pension industry (Appendix I provides a comprehensive list of 
those involved).  
The permanent staff of the commission consisted of two researchers, two editorial 
and production workers, two employees for word processing and production, one short 
hand reporter, one librarian, one executive secretary, one legal counsellor, one editor and 
two individuals serving as research directors responsible for the actuarial research (Haley 
1980, Volume I, vi-ix). Members of the staff were experts in pensions drawn from 
outside government. These included Marie Corbett (legal counsel) – an esteemed pension 
lawyer (Shilton 2011, 98) – who oversaw and coordinated the endeavours of the 
commission (Haley 1980, Volume I, ix), and Gordon Milling (editor) – an expert in 
labour policy and former director of research for the Ontario Federation of Labour 
(Shilton 2011, 156). 
Overseeing the expert actuarial research on behalf of the commission were two 
actuaries: Laurence Coward and Keith Cooper (Haley Commission 1980, Volume I, ix; 
Cooper et al. 1981, 720. Both Coward and Cooper were prominent actuaries within the 
field of pensions. Coward had been Chairperson of the Pension Commission of Ontario 
(1963-1965), President of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (1969-1970) (Duchense and 
Frenken 1993), and had also been the research director for the Ontario Committee on 
Portable Pensions in 1960 (Brown 1999, 30). Importantly, the research directors had a 
preference for studies using quantitative data, and accordingly Coward and Cooper 
directed some of the studies to use such quantitative data and cost benefit modeling in 
their analysis (Balcher and Shin 1984). The opportunity to conduct research was also 
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used by the directors to fill gaps in the body of pension research on pensions. Exploratory 
studies thus pursued answering questions that had not yet been examined. 
 These independent studies conducted on behalf of the commission were organized 
during the early phases while preparations were underway for public hearings and a 
public opinion poll. A total of 13 original studies were conducted, drawing from six 
disciplines: actuarial science (four researchers), accounting (three researchers), 
economics (two researchers), mathematics (two researchers), statistics (one researcher) 
and sociology (one researcher). Research was conducted by pension experts, 
mathematicians and civil servants (Haley 1980 Volume IX). The research was of a high 
quality, some of which was subsequently published in scientific journals (for example, 
Balcer and Sahin 1982; 1984).  
 The research of the Haley commission was generated alongside the public 
hearings of the commission. Therefore, while the research of other royal commissions has 
taken place without much communication between the research staff and the 
commissioners (Simeon 1987; Inwood 2005), this was not the case for the Haley 
commission. One reason why there was ongoing communication between the research 
staff and the commissioners was due to the reliance on these expert studies to clarify 
issues and provide facts when requested. Explaining how it undertook its task, the 
commission stated: 
As work progressed it became necessary to add certain subjects to the original research 
program, usually in order to seek clarification of facts where public submissions revealed 
sharp differences in perception of important occurrences and trends. At several stages the 
Commission used the services of actuaries and accountants in the execution of technical 
tasks, such as the testing of alternative benefit arrangements. (Haley 1980, Volume I, xiii) 
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Commissioners thus consulted the research staff to provide clear answers. Additional 
projects were added and ongoing studies were altered. Such work included actuarial 
studies and economic modeling that tested alternative pension arrangements seen as 
possessing the methodological strengths necessary to reveal more accurate and neutral 
answers (Haley 1980, Volume I, xiii).  
In seeking to undertake analysis that would fill gaps in the present body of 
knowledge, the commission also sought to identify the opinions of the public in a more 
accurate means than through public hearings. As stated by the commission, “[t]his 
approach required, in addition to research projects and hearings, an effort to elicit from 
the public information and opinions that might not otherwise come to light” (Haley 1980, 
Volume I, xii). The commission thus took the unorthodox action for a public inquiry 
(Hauser 1998) to conduct an opinion poll. This job was contracted out to Southam 
Marketing Research Services, who alongside the commissioners developed the 
questionnaire.  
Using a stratified sampling method to ensure representation of all Ontarians, the 
opinion poll was seen as a superior way to identify the views of Ontarians than the public 
hearings, subsequently viewed as a forum dominated by “interested parties” (Haley 1980, 
Volume XIII, 24). Furthermore, by conducting an opinion poll, the commission 
seemingly entrenched the view of the public in terms of public opinion. This occurrence 
is supported by theoretical works. According to Salter (2007), commissions that view the 
public primarily in terms of a sum of opinions, have a tendency to view hearings as a 
poor means to measure the general attitudes of society. Specifically, these inquiries often: 
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[fall] into the trap of seeing the people who choose to appear in its public hearings as being 
representative of everyone else. Once the fallacy of ‘those who show up are representative’ 
is exposed, cynicism sets in. Everyone who does show up becomes ‘a special interest’. 
(2007, 307)  
 
 Alongside the use of an opinion poll, the commission also conducted public 
hearings. These were held in eight cities across Ontario that included seven weeks in 
Toronto (Haley 1980, Volume I, xii).
7
 As early as September 1977, five months before 
the beginning of the scheduled hearings, the commission placed advertisements in all the 
daily newspapers in Ontario. These ads requested that briefs be prepared and submitted 
within three months (Public Announcement in The Globe and Mail September 8, 1977, 
B16). Groups with little previous knowledge of pensions thus rushed to develop a public 
submission (Haley 1978, Public Hearings, 17). Although the details relayed in these ads 
varied over time, at the beginning they openly requested that any “interested individuals 
and organizations” provide their “opinions, comments and information” (Public 
Announcement in The Globe and Mail September 8, 1977, B16).  
 The result was a total of 391 written submissions and 170 appearances before the 
commission (Haley 1980, Volume I, xii). The commission also directly contacted groups 
and individuals with a known interest in pension policy to hear their opinions. However, 
while the public advertisements for the hearings indiscriminately asked for actors to 
submit their “opinions, comments and information”, in this call for information the 
commission had a different standard. As stated by the commission in its guidelines for 
briefs:  
                                                          
7
 The cities are Timmins, Thunder Bay, London, Windsor, Hamilton, Sudbury, Ottawa and Toronto. 
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We are very much concerned that we use to best advantage the information and thought 
that go into the making of a brief. Briefs which no more than touch the problems or which 
provide solutions which do not fit into the overall picture are a waste of resources. 
Therefore the Commission would appreciate receiving proposals based on good data (data 
which could be made available to the commission on request) and detailed information on 
specific problems which are particularly within your knowledge or expertise. (Ontario 
Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario 1977, 1-2) 
  
 During the time the commission sat, its report became highly anticipated. In the 
words of one expert, “...the entire process of pension reform seemed to be brought to an 
entire standstill while people eagerly awaited the Royal Commission's report” (Baldwin 
1981, 61). Once released, its final report and background studies generated much 
discussion amongst interest groups (the National Action Committee on the Status of 
Women 1982; The Ontario Status of Women Council 1983), governments (Saskatchewan 
Labour 1981) and experts (Brown 1982). 
In the end, the output of the commission reflected its extensive research capacity. 
The final report was comprised of ten volumes (eight volumes of recommendations and 
two volumes of background papers) and totalled more than 2,000 pages. The 
commission’s recommendations were reached by the members with a significant degree 
of consensus. Of the 163 total recommendations, only two points – inflation tax credits 
(Haley 1980, Volume II, 245) and the use of unisex mortality tables for calculating 
benefits from money purchase plans and RRSPs (Haley 1980, Volume III, 126) – did not 
receive unanimous support by its members (Baldwin 1981).  
Importantly, the learning by the commission stayed close to the status quo of the 
policy core. The main functions of pensions identified by the commission were to; (a) 
provide a bare minimum living standard, referred to by the commission as the “anti-
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poverty” function (Haley 1980, Volume I, 1); and (b) encourage individuals to save for 
their retirement (Haley 1980, Volume 10, 2). The primary focus of the commission 
however, was to encourage individual savings. This emphasis on individual responsibility 
is found throughout the commission’s recommendations, and at times is explicitly stated: 
There is general agreement that retirement is an individual matter and that ultimately the 
individual is responsible for his or her own retirement. The Commission places the prime 
responsibility for providing retirement income on the individual. Individual needs and 
desires require flexibility, which cannot be given by group programs or universal social 
programs. Secondly, the Commission thinks that self-reliance should be encouraged and 
rewarded….Our society should not reach a stage of social “over-insurance” where 
individual effort seems futile or unrewarding. There should be real economic value to 
work, and to work and save should have greater value than not working and not saving. 
(Haley 1980, Volume I, 18) 
 
 
Accordingly, the main problem identified with the present system was 
impediments discouraging individuals from contributing towards their retirement. The 
solutions developed to address these problems also strongly reflected the standard 
approach. As the commission stated: 
In the Commission's opinion the answer to these difficulties is a change in the philosophy 
underlying employment pension design and the use of government authority for the 
protection of all workers in Ontario. The necessary change in approach is away from group 
responsibility and toward individual responsibility in the provision of retirement income 
through employment pensions. This shift would reflect not only Individualism but a 
recognition that cost subsidies among members of a group are no longer as acceptable as 
they were in the 1960s. (Haley 1980, Volume II, 305) 
 
 
This emphasis on the individual was also recognized by observers. As stated by 
the Financial Post:  
The Haley Commission has thus taken a giant step away from the welfare state 
drift in pension policy. The fully-funded portable PURS, to be supervised by the 
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individual would invest these savings to best advantage in capital markets, 
financing industrial expansion and fixed asset creation (The Financial Post, 
August 23, 1981). 
 
As the policy core of pensions already strongly reflected a preference for 
individual responsibility, the notion that the underlying “philosophy” of pensions needed 
to be changed to place greater emphasis on individual responsibility is not a change in 
kind, but instead one of degree as the preference for individual responsibility was already 
prevalent within pension policy. 
This standard approach to pensions is apparent in all of the commission’s 
recommendations and especially its recommendation for the Provincial Universal 
Retirement System (PURS). The commission envisioned the establishment of the PURS 
as a mandatory defined-contribution plan with contributions from employers at two 
percent, and increasing levels of employee contributions from one to two percent as they 
moved closer to retirement. It was also recommended that the PURS have immediate 
vesting and complete portability. The objective of the PURS was to improve the 
replacement ratio of individuals by helping them contribute to their retirement through a 
savings program (Halel 1980, Volume II, 309). The PURS thus reflected Hall’s second 
order learning: the core goals and standard problem definitions remained, while a new 
policy instrument was proposed to address present challenges. 
 Disappointed with these recommendations, those challenging the status quo 
criticized the commission for various reasons. Some critiques were based on the means 
by which the conclusions were reached. The findings of the consulted background 
studies, as well as the opinion survey, were claimed to have had serious limitations. For 
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instance, the basis for favouring the DC funded method of the PURS over the PAYGO 
method of the C/QPP was in part based on public opinion data gathered by the consumer 
survey (Haley 1980, Volume II, 318-319). However, according to some, relying on this 
quantitative survey method to gage public opinion was flawed due to the way in which 
the questions were asked (Baldwin 1981, 41). 
  Others noted that the scope of the debate failed to include those traditionally 
marginalized in pension discussions. While the positions of retirees, business and labour 
were all accounted for, the concerns of women were ignored. By only focusing on wage 
earners in the paid labour force, the commission’s examination of pensions from a 
gendered perspective was seen as inadequate (Donnelly 1993). 
 As one of the concerns that led to the Great Pension Debate (Ascah 1984), it is 
not surprising that the issue of women and pensions received some attention by the Haley 
commission, including its own specific analysis (see, “Women and the Provision of 
Retirement Income”, Volume III; and “Issues Relating the Benefit Features: the Unpaid 
Worker”, Volume V). The commission addressed several issues pursuant to women 
including employment pensions, part-time work, the CPP and OAS, survivor benefits, 
anti-discrimination laws, and the issue of homemakers. However, as with other issues 
addressed by the commission, the problem of women and pensions was interpreted within 
the standard policy core by emphasizing the earnings-related nature of pensions. This 
incrementalism stands in stark contrast to the recommendations of the Parliamentary 
Task Force on Pension Reform established just two years after the publication of the 
Haley commission’s report.  
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The Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform 
 In 1982 the federal Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau 
established its own study of the Canadian pension system, in what it hoped would be the 
final step before policy change. As stated by the chair of the committee before 
conducting public consultations, “this is it; this is the final study. Recommendations and 
probably legislation will come next, so you would be best advised to make your views 
known to us” (Provencher 1983a). 
 The inquiry was the third move in the study of pensions by a government 
committed to making pensions one of its policy priorities, but had remained vague over 
specific proposals for reform (Desjardins 1988; Rusk 1982). The first move by the 
Liberal government came two years before, between March 31
st
 and April 2nd, 1981, 
with the organization of the National Pensions Conference (NPC) in Ottawa. The NPC’s 
objective was to raise awareness of the problems facing the pension system and to discuss 
ideas for change. In doing so it brought together an array of actors including 
representatives from: federal and provincial governments, the pension industry, 
businesses, labour, as well as seniors and social welfare groups (Paltiel 1982). Women’s 
groups also participated, including the National Council of Women of Canada, and the 
NAC, as well as prominent researchers such as, Louise Dulude, Kevin Collins (Women 
and Pensions 1978) and Monica Townson (National Pensions Conference 1981). 
 The NPC was organized around the common issues receiving attention during the 
Great Pension Debate (including the Haley commission). These issues were: adequate 
coverage of the employed, inflation, portability and vesting, and barriers to women in 
attaining pension coverage (National Pensions Conference 1981a). 
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 Some however critiqued the NPC for its shallow discussion of the issues (Slocum 
1981), while others criticized the weak representation of women despite the availability 
of public grants from the federal government to encourage their participation (National 
Conference Proceedings 1981, 104; Paltiel 1982). This lack of female representation led 
Monica Townson, a researcher at the Economic Council of Canada, to call for greater 
involvement of women through the establishment and funding of regional conferences, 
something the government would later do in September 1981. 
 After the NPC, the second step of the Trudeau government was to compile and 
release a Green Paper on pension reform in December 1982 – Better Pensions for 
Canadians. The main aspects of pensions which had received attention throughout the 
Great Pension Debate were addressed in the Green Paper (Canada, Department of 
Finance 1982). The positions in the Green Paper reflected the negotiated positions of the 
internally divided government towards pension reform at this time (Wolfson 1988, 224). 
Reflecting Graham Allison’s (1969) “Bureaucratic Politics” (Model III), conflict existed 
between the department of National Health and Welfare (advocating for an increased role 
of the public sector) and the Department of Finance (favouring private solutions) over the 
best means to address pensions (Desjardins 1988, 165). The Liberal government was not 
entirely in disagreement however, as the idea of a homemaker pension, advocated by 
some women’s groups, was unanimously rejected amongst members of the party 
(Wolfson 1988, 224). As with the Haley commission, the plight of women and pensions 
was interpreted in terms of the traditional approach to pensions by focusing on how 
adjustments to the earnings-related programs (for example, shorter vesting periods or 
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increased survivor benefits) could improve the condition of women (Canada, Department 
of Finance, 1982).  
 While the Green Paper was built on negotiated positions within the Liberal party 
and participants at the NPC, it was still clear that within the broader community, 
consensus over appropriate solutions had yet to be achieved. With the objective of 
developing such consensus it was decided that a parliamentary committee would be 
established to study the proposals of the Green Paper (The Globe and Mail, October 18, 
1982). The Trudeau government thus took its third step on pension reform on March 1, 
1983, and established the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform. As with the 
Haley commission, the primary objective of the Parliamentary Task Force on Pension 
Reform was to generate consensus amongst opposing interests. Accordingly the 
committee’s membership contained representatives from all political parties within the 
legislature. 
 From the Liberal party, Douglas Frith was appointed Chairperson. Frith – a 
pharmacist before being elected to Parliament – was a rising star within the Liberal party, 
and his appointment to head the committee was seen as a test prior to receiving a Cabinet 
portfolio. Also from the Liberal party was Louis Desmarais (Vive-Chairperson), Therese 
Killens, Russell MacLellan and David Weatherhead. Progressive Conservatives included 
Vincent Dantzer (Vice-Chairperson), John Reid and Flora MacDonald. Ted Miller from 
the New Democratic Party was also appointed. 
 Unlike the Haley commission whose members were familiar with the technical 
properties of pensions, the members of the Frith committee lacked such previous 
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knowledge (Frith 1981). Recognizing the committee members’ lack of familiarity with 
pensions, several briefing sessions were held to explain the details and debates of the 
Canadian pension system (Rusk 1983; Provencher 1983a). These sessions included 
retreats to study problems in other countries (the United States), and were conducted by 
the committee’s permanent staff as well as by experts from society (Provencher 1983a).  
 Also reflecting the trend of parliamentary committee’s (Trebilcock et al. 1982) the 
Frith committee’s mandate was more focused than that of the Haley commission. Its 
Order of Reference told the committee to: “examine and report upon the proposals for 
reform of the Canadian retirement income system contained in the Government’s paper 
Better Pensions for Canadians”. The committee was asked to pay particular attention to:  
Protecting benefits under occupational pension plans; against inflation; modifying survivor 
benefits under the Canadian and Quebec Pension Plans; expanding mandatory pension 
arrangements; financing the Canadian Pension Plan; and overcoming the special pension 
problems facing women, including home makers, under the current pension system. (Frith 
1983, 2) 
   
 The Firth committee did not mirror every trait of parliamentary committees, 
however. Generally, the activities of parliamentary committees are noted for being more 
private than royal commissions, whose actions and final reports become public 
information (Trebilcock et al. 1982). This private characteristic of committees was not 
the case with the Frith committee, which conducted public hearings, made transcripts 
public information, received attention in the media, and presented its recommendations in 
a public report.  
51 
 
The public nature of the Frith committee was not part of its original design. In an 
effort to reduce costs, the Trudeau government decided to refrain from making public the 
recordings or transcripts of the hearings. Receiving criticisms from opposition parties and 
the media for this move that would negate the public nature of the inquiry, the 
government reversed its decision, and made the committee’s events public information 
(The Globe and Mail 1983a). This controversy actually served to further increase the 
public attention the committee received, and even before the committee began its work, it 
had already received a fair amount of public attention (for example, The Globe and Mail 
1983b). In terms of its public dimension, the Frith committee was thus very similar to the 
Haley commission. 
 The committee was formed during a gloomier economic climate than preceding 
studies of the Great Pension Debate. A severe recession beginning in 1981 had a 
formidable influence on its approach to developing solutions. A particular concern of the 
committee was to make recommendations that were both politically viable and 
economically realistic. As stated by Frith during the public hearings and at pension 
conferences before industry officials, “we are in a severe recession and it is as good a 
time as any to take a realistic approach to pension reform” (Galt 1983; also see Rusk 
1983 December 16, for an example by other committee members). Concerns with the 
practicality of recommendations were not limited to the Liberal members of the 
committee; being confident that they would form the next government, members from the 
Progressive Conservatives were also concerned that the solutions developed be politically 
and technically feasible (The Globe and Mail 1984, March 8).  
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 The committee’s need to report within ten months limited its ability to conduct 
extensive independent research, despite being granted the powers to use “expert, 
professional, technical and clerical staff as may be deemed necessary” (Frith 1983, iv, 2). 
Due to its focus on reconciling differences, the committee shied away from undertaking 
new analysis of the Canadian pension system. It was felt that enough analytical research 
was already available, and thus the research generated by the committee primarily used 
past studies (Frith 1983, 2-6). Whereas the longer time frame of the Haley commission 
allowed it to undertake studies providing new analysis, the Frith committee lacked such 
original studies. Instead, the research provided a synopsis of the existing material 
highlighting common points of agreements and differences. As suggested by Jenson 
(1994, 55), differences in the nature of the research generated for inquiries can influence 
how problems are studied and solutions develop. Elaborated further in chapter six, the 
nature of the research contributed to the committee’s hesitation to exclusively use 
scientific works. 
Like the Haley commission, the Frith committee also consulted actors from think 
tanks, universities, and the civil service to provide information; some of who were also 
used by the Haley commission, such as Harvey Lazar (Appendix I). The committee’s 
research staff was drawn from the civil service, as well as the bureaus of each represented 
party. While the background of this research staff was different, the size of the full-time 
research staff was similar to the Haley commission. The committee had two staff 
members for the analysis of evidence, one researcher from each of the political parties’ 
research bureau (in the effort to limit partisanship) (Frith 1983, viii), as well as two 
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administrators overseeing the committee’s logistics, administration and media relations 
(Provencher 1983b).  
The research director of the Frith committee was A. Rodney Dobell (Frith 1983). 
In respect to his understanding of economics and mathematics, Dobell had a similar 
background as the research directors of the Haley commission. Before working for the 
Frith committee, Dobell had been an Assistant Professor in economics at Harvard 
University where he was involved in developing longitudinal micro simulation models 
used in social policy analysis (Dobell nd). However, Dobell also had experience inside 
government as a high ranking civil servant within the Treasury Board Secretariat and the 
Department of Finance (Dobell nd).  
Dobell’s experience as an administrator and an academic led him to hold a broad 
view as to what types of information were pertinent in policy analysis. For instance, in an 
article discussing policy analysis published just before the establishment of the Frith 
committee, Dobell states: 
The same sort of limits [of knowledge] apply when it comes to what we can know about 
government programs. The motive which led to the social indicators movement was 
simple: economic indicators could not account for growing unrest in a time of rising 
material well-being, and the search for measures which better captured perceptions of the 
quality of life spread. But this search encountered inevitable confrontation with the limits 
on human knowledge: as the indicators demanded became ever more comprehensive and 
general, the ability to link them with any specific program or action or decision by 
government faded entirely.  
So too with evaluation in government. The motive which led to this work was simple 
and laudable: those who make decisions on behalf of the community need relevant 
information on which to base those decisions. But inevitably, the  unavoidable  natural 
limits  are  encountered: as the size of the community grows, and the  scale of the  
decisions  expands, the  scope  of  the relevant information broadens to embrace all  




According to Dobell, the very economic models he spent his academic career 
developing, were useful to understand an issue, but should not be the only source of 
information used to make policy decisions. Decisions should instead use information 
drawn from a variety of human experiences (1981, 425). Dobell’s broad definition as to 
what types of information were relevant in policy analysis thus likely complemented the 
same openness to non-expert information held by members of the Frith committee. 
 As with the Haley commission, there was frequent communication between 
research staff and committee members. Research was generated alongside the public 
hearings, and was used to clarify issues emerging during the public hearings. The 
committee’s research staff actively participated at the public hearings by clarifying points 
and asking questions (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings 11:77; 31:31; 36:38; 
37:89).  
The public hearings of the Frith committee were extensive and held across the 
country in twelve cities. The sum of these hearings (523 written briefs and oral 
presentations) was slightly larger than that received by the Haley commission, and 
included submissions from the pension industry, businesses, labour, as well as seniors 
and women’s groups. 
 In December, 1983, ten months after the Frith committee was established, it 
presented its final report totalling 168 pages, and 64 recommendations. In many respects 
the report followed the Green Paper by suggesting incremental adjustments to programs 
already in place, such as increases in the GIS, and modifications to regulations 
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overseeing RRPs. Despite these incremental recommendations, the committee made a 
major divergence from the standard approach to pensions. While addressing each of the 
main issues focused on throughout the Great Pension Debate; the issue of women and 
pensions received the most attention. Of the 64 recommendations, 18 addressed the issue 
of women and pensions. In essence, women and pensions was viewed as the prominent 
issue of pension reform (Frith 1983, 73). Not only did women and pensions receive 
extensive attention, but the committee challenged the predominant view of pensions as an 
instrument associated with retirement income. Instead, pension policy was framed as an 
issue of gender equity, where  the pension system was seen as an institution perpetuating 
the subordinate role of women in society. As stated by the committee of the character of 
the problems facing the Canadian pension system:  
It is a problem of acknowledging and adequately providing for the work women do, both 
inside and outside the labour force, and of identifying the institutions and arrangements, 
including pension arrangements, that must be change to make this possible. (Frith 1983, 
74) 
 
The committee put forth the idea of a “homemaker pension”, where any person 
working within the home and caring for a spouse or a dependent, would receive benefits 
credited to the CPP based on half of the YMPE. Benefits would be funded by general tax 
revenues and contributions from other income earners within the home (Frith 1983, 25-
26). Providing a pension for domestic work, as opposed to merely splitting pension 
credits, was seen as recognizing the labour done within the home, historically 
predominantly done by women.  
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This was a radical divergence from how the issue of women and pensions had 
been previously treated during the Great Pension Debate. Prior to the Frith committee, 
concerns over women and pensions were addressed by focusing on increasing the 
opportunity to participate in earnings-related plans. By insisting on the integrity of the 
private mechanisms of pensions, the problem of women and pensions was defined in 
terms of access to the labour market. Gender biases embedded within social institutions, 
including policy programs and the economy, were not a part of such discussions.  
 This radical reframing of pensions was a conscious act acknowledged by the 
committee: 
In carrying out our task we ranged somewhat outside the proposals of the Green Paper. To 
arrive at a coherent set of reform proposals we had to examine broader issues and problems 
mentioned by witnesses appearing before us. (Frith 1983, 2) 
 
 Therefore, while past studies have shown that the mandates of commissions can 
be altered or even ignored by commissioners (Jenson 1994), little has been documented 
showing the same actions by parliamentary committees. Instead, when parliamentary 
committees do receive attention they are frequently cast as likely to generate learning 
following the political party’s agenda (for example, Wilson 1971; Hodgetts 1968). The 
Frith committee however, went beyond what was party policy at the time (Desjardins 
1988; Canada, Department of Finance 1982; Minister Responsible for the Status of 
Women; Frith 1983, Public Hearings: 15:14), and put forth radical solutions to address 
problems it had not been mandated to examine. 
 According to Hall’s classification of learning, the committee’s recommendations 
exemplify third order learning. The fundamental goals and problems associated with 
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pension policy were reframed. However, in an attempt to make its recommendations 
easily turned into actual policy (Frith 1983, 5), no new program was suggested. It was 
instead recommended that the C/QPP move beyond its earnings-related nature. This 
observation thus indicates that in times where the core objectives and problems are 
reframed, the previously existing programs need not also be completely overhauled to 
function within the new policy core. In short, third order learning does not necessitate 
that the policy instruments also be changed. 
 Despite attempts at consensus, the committee’s final recommendations only 
reflected the views of eight members. Ted Miller from the New Democratic Party 
provided a dissenting opinion alongside the committee’s report. While Miller disagreed 
with many of the committee’s recommendations, including a homemaker pension, he also 
recognized gender biases in the pension system and concurred with the principle of 
recognizing the economic value of domestic labour (Frith 1983, 149), albeit in a different 




 The Haley commission was the first and largest policy review to study pensions 
during the Great Pension Debate. Made up of pension experts, the commission was given 
a broad mandate and an assortment of resources to study pensions over three years. Two 
expert actuaries were appointed to oversee those background studies with an actuarial 
nature. This opportunity to generate research was thus used to produce studies delivering 
novel insight that could fill gaps in the present body of knowledge. By possessing 
original studies the commission felt that it held information which was superior to that 
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produced by previous works. These expert studies were thus used to clarify questions 
emerging from the public hearings and therefore done alongside the other activities of the 
commission. 
 The commission also took the unorthodox step of involving the public via an 
opinion poll. This too however was seen as offering superior insight into the opinions of 
the public, and also led the commission to view the public hearings as dominated by 
‘interested parties”. Shown in the next chapter, appointing two actuarial experts to 
oversee research, and possessing studies and opinion polls seen as providing new and 
superior information, would complement the commission member’s preference for expert 
information. 
Despite its vast resources the final recommendations of the commission reflected 
the standard approach of pensions by focusing on improving the arrangements for 
individuals to contribute to their retirement income. The national debate surrounding 
pensions continued after the Haley commission, and two years after the commission’s 
final report was published the Federal government established the Parliamentary Task 
Force on Pension Reform. 
The Frith committee varied from the Haley commission in some important 
respects. First, the committee’s membership was made up of politicians. The committee 
was also given a more specific mandate to review the proposals outlined in a Green Paper 
in the span of ten months. Another difference was a research director preferring to make 
decisions using information based on a range of experiences including non-expert 
methods. The nature of the research generated for the Frith committee was also different. 
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Whereas the Haley commission possessed original exploratory research, the Frith 
committee lacked such novel studies. Instead, the research staff provided synthesis of the 
body of works already produced, highlighting common conflicts and debates. As shown 
in the next chapter, being presented with such research furthered the Frith committee’s 
hesitation to exclusively use scientific works in its analysis. 
Both inquiries however, also shared some commonalities (see Table 5). With the 
intention to develop consensus amongst a variety of interests, both inquiries contained a 
medium amount of members. Both inquiries also conducted public hearings over an 
extended period of time in several locations, which resulted in submissions from 
business, labour, seniors and women’s groups. In the end however, the Frith committee’s 
recommendations reframed pensions from an issue concerned with retirement income and 
the prevention of poverty, into an issue of gender equity.  
 
Table 5: Structure of Haley Commission and Frith Committee 
 Haley Commission Frith Committee 
Members 5 members 9 members 
Research Director Actuaries Civil servant/expert 
Research Staff Outside civil service Inside civil service 
Relationship Between 
Staff  
Participatory and ongoing  Participatory and ongoing  
Independent Research Original projects Reliance on past studies 
Temporal Period  36 Months  10 months  
Public Participation Public invitation and 
private requests 





Chapter Six: Learning by Experts and Politicians 
Two components of problem solving 
Can the differing recommendations of the Haley commission and the Frith 
committee be explained by variances in how experts and politicians solve problems? If 
so, what observable implications are expected?  
To better discriminate between how experts and politicians solve problems, I 
distinguish between: (a) the types of information used to study an issue; and (b) how 
conclusions are drawn from such information (Table 6). It is first hypothesized that 
experts prefer information developed by the standards of their discipline, whereas 
politicians will make greater use of non-expert information.  
 
H1) Experts will primarily use scientific information. 
H2) Politicians will be make greater use of non-scientific information. 
 
Secondly, it is hypothesized that politicians will draw conclusions by negotiating 
amongst opposing interests. It is also expected that when making decisions politicians 
will explicitly consider the normative dimensions of issues. As for experts, it is 
hypothesized that they will base their conclusions exclusively on expert data. If the 
conclusions from non-expert information conflicts with the conclusions provided by 
experts, the former should be discarded so as to make the ‘right’.  
 





H4) Politicians will draw conclusions in consideration of social values. 
 
H5) Conclusions drawn from experts will reflect the conclusions provided in 
 scientific studies rather than those from non-expert sources. 
 
Table 6: Ideal Typology of Problem Solving for Politicians and Experts 
 
Actors Drawing Conclusions Types of Information 
Experts 
 







(Inspired by Garvin 2001 and Radaelli 2005) 
  
Following the methods used by Inwood (2005), the first set of hypotheses is tested 
by counting and categorizing the referenced information in the final reports of the two 
inquiries. The categories are divided into groups of public consultations, submissions by 
the public, policy reviews, government information (such as departmental reports), 
academic works (peer-reviewed journals or edited books), and independent research 
(research conducted on behalf of the inquiry). Noting the strong use of regulations as a 
policy instrument in pension policy (Brown 1999), the additional category of law has also 
been added, which includes references to acts, judgements, and other judicial writings.  
It is difficult to develop a classification of information that is mutually exclusive. 
For instance, a government document could contain content from public consultations 
and opinions. In those cases where a source could fall into more than one category, I have 
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categorized them according to their authorship. This method is congruent with the social 
dimension of expertise defined in this work. Despite this limitation, this method allows 
for the general tendency of preferences for different types of information to be identified.  
 As shown in Figure 1, the findings confirm the first set of hypotheses. Nearly half 
of the Frith committee’s references were to information provided by the public. The 
committee also made little use of independent research and academic sources, but did 
frequently use policy reviews (36 percent). The high use of policy reviews is explained 
by its frequent reference to the Green Paper (75 percent of the references to policy 
reviews), done to explain how the committee’s recommendations varied from the 
proposals of the Green Paper. 
 The dissenting opinion of Ted Miller provides another opportunity to test the 
hypothesis. If the politicians of the Frith committee had a specific preference for non-
expert information, then the same outcome should again be observed. As shown in Figure 
2, this is the case as public consultations and submissions accounted for over 81 percent 











Figure 1: Referenced Information – The Haley Commission and Frith Committee 
 
(Haley N = 983; Frith N =122) 
 
Figure 2: Referenced Information – Dissenting Opinion 
 














































Sources of Information in Percentage 
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 The findings also confirm the expectations of the Haley commission. Totaling 16 
percent of the citations, the commission’s reliance on public information is approximately 
three times less than the Frith committee’s. Instead, the Haley commission made more 
use of expert information. This expert information was not academic studies however, but 
was the independent research conducted on the commission’s behalf (19 percent). The 
commission also made a high use of judicial writings (20 percent) providing legal 
interpretations of regulations and statutes. In sum, the members of the Haley commission 
and the Frith committee did vary in the types of information used to study pensions and 
develop solutions. 
 The second difference hypothesized to exist between the experts of the Haley 
commission and politicians of the Frith committee concerns how conclusions are drawn 
from information. This is tested by tracing the reasons behind specific decisions, through 
an analysis of the final reports and proceedings of the inquiries.  
 
Haley commission 
 The Haley commission’s recommendations show a clear preference for drawing 
conclusions from empirical data adhering to scientific standards, especially the 
independent research generated on its behalf. Information obtained through public 
consultation was not however completely ignored. Instead, the commission used public 
submissions as an important means to scan for alternative solutions of reform. In the 
words of the commission, input from the public established a “…useful point of departure 
for a more detailed examination” (Haley 1980, Volume I, 4).  
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 While useful to identify alternative proposals of reform, the information provided 
from the public was not used to draw conclusions. As the passage quoted above continues 
to say, “[public input] does not, by itself, establish a clear-cut philosophical basis for 
predictions about the future or prescriptions for government action” (Haley 1980, 
Volume I, 4). What did provide a prescriptive means to draw conclusions however, were 
empirical scientific studies, especially actuarial and economic based models. In the face 
of conflicting evidence from the public, the independent research frequently served as the 
deciding factor letting the facts speak for themselves. 
 The inability to use information provided by the public was related to its political 
nature, and methodological shortcomings (for example, Haley 1978, Public Hearings, 
Cassette 17). Explaining how it made its final recommendations, the commission 
repeatedly mentioned problems with evidence presented from the public, specifically, 
irresolvable conflicts. In such circumstances, the neutral character of the expert work was 
viewed as offering a reliable answer. For example, the Haley commission states that it 
“found no sound basis in principle for choosing one level of adequacy from among the 
levels proposed [through public consultations]. It therefore turned to the empirical 
evidence it received [conducted by scientific experts]” (Haley 1980, Volume I, 174, also 
see 168). 
 Importantly, the empirical evidence was largely economic modeling using 
cost/benefit analysis. As stated by the commission explaining how alternative proposals 
were judged: 
Proposals for pension reform accordingly should be assessed against a range of economic 
scenarios; techniques that promise the best results in the widest variety of economic 
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conditions clearly are to be favoured over those that rely on heavily on the most optimistic 
or pessimistic economic predictions. (Haley 1980, Volume I, 7) 
 
 Furthermore, when the conclusions from these expert studies challenged the 
evidence gathered from the public, the former was preferred. As stated by the 
commission: 
Some briefs to the Commission have called for indexing government programs to wages so 
that recipients will share in the productivity gains made by the economy after their 
assumed withdrawal from the work force. The commission would not favour such a 
change. We have seen [through economic modeling prepared on behalf of the commission, 
(Haley 1980, Volume 5, Appendix F)] how indexing to the CPI affects the cost of the OAS 
and the CPP, and to move to wage indexing would be even more costly. (Haley 1980, 
Volume I, 164) 
 
 The appeal of disciplines which can provide seemingly conclusive answers 
reflects similar findings by Inwood (2005) and Simeon (1987) that a defining reason for 
the recommendations of the Macdonald commission was the ability of economists to 
provide answers to questions with a degree of consensus, and not just present a body of 
conflicting evidence. Providing conclusive answers, actuarial studies were thus an 
important source of information for the Haley commission. Accordingly, the appointment 
of two actuaries to oversee some of the research of the commission, who took the 
opportunity to produce novel studies seeking conclusive answers to fill gaps in the body 
of knowledge on the Canadian pension system, complemented the desire of the 
commissioners to use the best possible scientific information in making decisions. 
The same preference for using cost/benefit analysis in making decisions was 
emphasized by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) in their submission to the Haley 
commission, and expressed to commission members at the CIA annual general meeting 
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which they attended (CIA 1978). Providing an “actuarial perspective” (CIA 1978, i), the 
CIA also stressed the need to move beyond a limited analysis of pensions and take a 
broader analysis of all retirement arrangements. In doing so it was further recommended 
that the commission focus on the role and responsibility of individuals, governments and 
employers (CIA 1978). As the previous President of the CIA, and now overseeing the 
independent research generated on behalf of the commission, it seems that research 
director Laurence Coward and the commissioners were sympathetic to the views of these 
pension experts. As shown in chapter five, the Haley commission adopted an analytical 
framework to guide its research that studied all retirement arrangements with a focus on 
the role and responsibility of individuals, governments and employers.  
The influence of expert studies on the Haley commission is made clear by tracing 
the decision-making process of specific recommendations. With a total of 163 
recommendations, examining each is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, focus is 
placed on two of the most pertinent recommendations: the creation of the Provincial 
Universal Retirement System (PURS), (and to provide a comparison with the Frith 
committee), the recommendations concerning women and pensions.  
 The main recommendation of the Haley commission was the establishment of the 
PURS, and encompasses many of the smaller findings by the expert studies, such as those 
concerning plan membership, portability and indexing. Moreover, the findings of these 
studies led to conclusions reaffirming the efficiency of an approach to pensions with a 




The necessary change in approach is away from group responsibility and toward individual 
responsibility in the provision of retirement income through employment pensions. This 
shift would reflect not only individualism but a recognition that cost subsidies among 
members of a group are no longer as acceptable as they were in the 1960s, perhaps 
because of an increased awareness of the long-term effects of such subsidies. (Haley 1980, 
Volume II, 305-306) 
 
 These costs identified by the commission were highlighted in expert studies. 
Works showed greater costs for plans with PAYGO funding methods and DB plan 
structures. The preference for a DC plan structure – where the benefits received by the 
retiree are directly tied to his or her own contributions, contributions on behalf of the 
employer, as well as growth on the invested contributions – were founded on the 
conclusions of the commission’s independent studies (Baldwin 1981, 42). Specifically, 
the structure of the PURS was based on the findings of the research produced by Balcer 
and Sahin (1982; 1984) modeling the outcomes of various plan arrangements against a 
number of different economic and demographic conditions (Haley 1980, Volume II, 38-
43, 92-95). Furthermore, the identification of this “increased awareness of the long-terms 
effects” mentioned by the commission was based on the statistical opinion polling (Haley 
1980, Volume II, 319) 
 How relying on expert studies impacted the commission’s recommendations is 
apparent in its study of women and pensions, due to the differing descriptions of the 
issues and the problems relayed by experts and women’s groups. Women’s groups 
emphasized the inherent gendered biases within society and the need to recognize the 
economic value of work done within the home (for example Haley 1978, Public Hearings 
Cassette 17 side B; YWCA Metropolitan Toronto Cassette 16, and Brief page 6). It was 
maintained that addressing the issue of women and pensions by increasing participation 
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in the labour force would fail to address the root of the problem: gender-biases over the 
definition of work. Examples of the above include claims by the Ontario Status of 
Women Council: 
Because society has not generally accepted the principle that the costs of perpetuating this 
society should be shared by everyone, society has allowed women to bear the economic 
burden for child rearing, especially in cases where there is marriage breakdown, 
widowhood or divorce. (emphasis added, 1977, 3) 
 
 However, the commission’s preference to use information generated according to 
the standards of economics and actuarial science created an “expertise barrier” 
(Parthasarathy 2010) obstructing women’s groups not using such methods from 
meaningfully participating in such deliberations. 
 In the end, the proposal for a homemaker pension as suggested by some women’s 
groups was rejected on the basis that the facts of the independent research studies could 
not be ignored: 
At first blush the proposal [for the inclusion of homemakers in the CPP]
8
 is attractive and 
apparently forward-looking; but if one examines the ramifications of such a move, there 
are some aspects which could actually undermine the present effectiveness of the CPP. 
(Haley 1980, Volume V, 112-113) 
 
 Such ‘ramifications’ were identified by the actuarial costing of the expert studies. 
More than being concerned with the efficiency of including homemakers into the 
earnings-related CPP, the expert studies (in particular those by Daniel Kubat and Harry 
Weitz), using demographic forecasting, concluded that the issue of women and pensions 
                                                          
8
 The commission rejects the inclusion of homemakers through voluntary contributions as well as through 
general tax revenues.  
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was no longer a pressing concern due to the increasing participation of women in the 
labour force (Haley 1980, Volume V, 113). It was thus decided that the concerns of 
women and pensions could be addressed within the traditional earnings-related approach 
by making incremental adjustments to regulations overseeing RRPs (Haley 1980, 
Volume III, 118).  
 Furthermore, input from the public on this issue was limited to the opinions 
gathered through the opinion survey (Haley 1980, Volume III, 118). However, the 
closed-ended format of the survey did not allow women to discuss their concerns, in an 
open dialogue that may have highlighted issues and concerns unbeknown to the 
commissioner. Instead, the survey asked respondents to provide the response most 
reflecting their view amongst a predetermined set of answers. Therefore, when it was 
noted that one of the key findings of the opinion survey was the different working 
patterns of women, any discussion of these different patterns, including underlying 
structural impediments, or the implications of these patterns on the lives of women or 
their retirement, was left unaddressed (Haley 1980, Volume XIII, 70-71). Evidence from 
women suggesting that increased participation would not adequately address the most 
embedded aspects of problems facing women was thus not recognized by the 
commission. Ultimately, the commission failed to recognize the structural problems 
within the pension system highlighted by women’s groups. 
 The preoccupation with expert information is also evidenced in the outline for 
briefs and submissions created by the commission (quoted at length in chapter five): 
We are very much concerned that we use to best advantage the information and thought 
that go into the making of a brief…Therefore the Commission would appreciate receiving 
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proposals based on good data…and detailed information on specific problems which are 
particularly within your knowledge or expertise. (Ontario Royal Commission on the Status 
of Pensions in Ontario 1977, 1-2) 
  
 This preference for ‘good data’ was sustained during the public hearings. The 
commission expressed interest in any technical information groups based their positions 
upon. Such information was diligently analyzed by the commissioners, and long periods 
of the hearings were spent questioning the methods and findings of submissions (for 
example, Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 14). In some cases, groups presenting 
statistical, actuarial and economic based research were asked to appear again before the 
commission to further discuss their findings (Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 14). 
Such invitations were not extended to groups presenting positions based on methods 
outside these methods however, although the commission did state its interest in 
receiving any statistical information mentioned by groups but not included in their 
written submissions (Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 17, Cassette 18).  
Generally however, the commission did not think highly of the information 
gathered from the public. Instead, the commission was so “disturbed to learn that few 
people understand even the basic arrangements used in Ontario to provide income in 
retirement” (Haley 1980 Volume IV, i) that it prepared a pamphlet outlining retirement 
arrangements to better educate the public. 
 Due to its limited view as to the types of information relevant in policy analysis, 






 Analysis of how the Frith committee drew its conclusions confirms some of the 
hypothesized expectations concerning the decision-making style of politicians, while 
other aspects are rejected. Members of the Frith committee were preoccupied with 
developing conclusions according to consensus, although it eventually became 
recognized that doing so was as an impossible task. Instead, the committee viewed the 
body of scientific evidence as conflicting in nature, and viewed the ability of actuarial 
forecasting to accurately predict the future as less than desirable. A contributing factor to 
this view was the nature of the research the committee received (Frith 1983, 2-4), as well 
as the background of its research director. 
 Recognizing conflicts amongst the body of scientific works, the members of the 
committee chose to base decisions on non-expert information gathered from the public. 
In many cases groups did not outline technical details, and instead focused on the 
principles upon which programs should be based. Basing decisions on social values, 
contrasts with the Haley commission’s actions to base decisions on the conclusions of 
empirical scientific studies. Each of these points is elaborated below.  
 In undertaking their study of pensions, the politicians sitting on the Frith 
committee explicitly embraced their professional identity as representative members of 
the public. This identity strongly affected how members approached their task. As stated 
by the committee in its final report:  
We are not pension experts. We have not second-guessed pension fund managers and their 
investment decisions…We do not pretend to provide superior technical expertise on the 
basis of which government can tell industry how to run the pension business. Our role is a 
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different one – that of striking a balance between contending views, a balance that is 
coherent, responsive to real needs, and sensitive to the economic climate. (Frith 1983, 5) 
  
 The committee also frequently identified with the information presented by the 
public through their experiences as politicians. While the experts of the Haley 
commission judged information presented according to scientific merits, the politicians of 
the Frith committee used their professional experiences to make-sense of the information 
from the public. For example, as one committee member told a witness: 
I feel very much at home, particularly listening to your testimony Mrs. Bell, and listening 
to the points that you describe about people around the bay having problems in getting to 
Newfoundland. I know what it is like, because in my own constituency not only people 
going into hospital but relatives, if they are going to visit them, have to take the train…And 
Nancy, I can certainly identify with you, because I am still learning [about pensions] and I 
have been on this for weeks and months. (emphasis added, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 
30:92) 
 
 Reflecting hypothesized expectations, the members of the committee did seek to 
make decisions according to negotiation and consensus. When speaking to umbrella 
organizations representing a diversity of groups, the committee was eager to identify 
whether a degree of consensus amongst the groups had been achieved (for example, Frith 
1983, Public Hearings, 11:66; 30:97; 34:18; 34:20). Members were also interested in 
developing agreement amongst groups with opposing interests, and asked whether 
differing groups had engaged in dialogue amongst themselves, and encouraged such 
discussions if they had not taken place (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 11:66; 
30:97). 
As the work of the committee progressed however, it was concluded that 
achieving such consensus was not possible (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 
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11:85; 9:47; 16:20; 23:132). Differences amongst groups over the goals of pension 
policy, as well as methodological assumptions used in generating information, became 
identified by the committee as an irresolvable component of pension policy (Frith 1983, 
15). 
For example, in one session of the public hearings Chairperson Frith noted that 
there was a good deal of consensus between the actuarial studies produced by the 
Business Committee on Pension Policy, and the background reports of the government’s 
Green Paper. Yet through the discussion, it became clear that substantial disagreements 
existed. The Chair goes on to say: 
I am not so sure that overall…what I said at the beginning [that consensus exists], Mr. 
Baird, I think stands true…Therefore, evidently we have a severe difference of opinion 
though on the pre-reform cost. Right? I am not sure I want to get bogged down on this 
technical detail, because I think we are not going to see the forest for the trees again if we 
do. (28: 13) 
 
The committee thus concluded that decisions could not be based on scientific 
findings alone: 
[concerns over] the difficulty of forecasting events in an uncertain world; the danger that 
large numbers of employees cashing out pension credits might jeopardize basically sound 
pension plans; and the sheer cost of moving from one policy or regulatory regime to 
another. These realities and constraints are why the Task Force relied on a process of 
consultation rather than on an exercise in pure analysis. (emphasis added, Frith 1983, 5) 
 
Therefore, whereas the Haley commission viewed expert studies as able to 
provide conclusive answers to the mix of views presented from the public, the members 
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of the Frith committee placed less confidence in such scientific studies (Frith 1983, 15).
9 
Instead, committee members turned to non-expert information from the public. Relying 
on different sources of information emphasized different aspects of the problems 
surrounding pensions and impacted the types of decisions made. 
One difference in the nature of public information was that it had a greater 
emphasis on the principles of policy and social values than found in expert studies. As 
stated by one group appearing before the Haley commission: 
Commission member:  Have you done any research on how that could be quantified? 
YWCA:  I must say that we have worked in terms of the time limit. This is a very, very 
complicated subject and we have worked with different groups and we have tried to take 
advantage, and what we have tried more tonight is in principle, to establish some of the 
things that we believe are vital. We do believe that the commission should examine these 
things [the technical details]…it is complicated and it would mean that we would have to 
again ourselves have to go again and hire and spend. It would be years [before the 
completion of the study]…So we are looking to the commission to take some of these 
suggestions that are in principle, that we have not had the money, or the time to explore, 
and hope, that you will on the basis of the principle explore it. (emphasis in the original, 
Haley 1980, Public Hearings, Cassette 18) 
 
 The same focus on principles rather than technicalities was mentioned by groups 
appearing before the Frith committee: 
Far be it from us to say that there would not be [technical] problems connected with it, but 
we feel they are surmountable. Why should so many women in Canada who are 
homemakers not be able to have a pension in their own right just because there are a few 
problems? Surely we can overcome these, as we have overcome other problems. (Public 
Hearings, 30:27) 
                                                          
9
 The committee also notes in its final report that, “predicting events over the intervals relevant to pension 
policy – periods of decades at least – is highly uncertain. Experience suggests that predictions will almost 
certainly be wrong” (Frith 1983, 15). 
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Most of these things can be solved mathematically; after all, getting to the moon was 
simply a mathematical solution. We feel that it can be done. Once it is recognized as a 
priority, it can be worked out. (Public Hearings, 11: 68) 
 
 The non-technical information provided by the public was viewed as an important 
source of information by the Frith committee, and the fact that politicians did not dismiss 
information that failed to outline programmatic specifics, challenges Kingdon’s claim 
that more specific ideas are more likely to be accepted (see Kingdon 2011, 116). Instead, 
politicians were open to broad ideas, encouraging groups lacking technical knowledge to 
share their insight, and expressing confidence that if the principles were correct, the 
details could later be resolved. Note, for example, Frith’s statement to the University 
Women’s Club of Edmonton: 
I know you mentioned that because of your lack of statistical and financial background you 
could only enunciate the principles of the homemakers pension. I can say, on behalf of the 
committee, that we have access to the statistical background and to the financial 
background. (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 25:42) 
 
 Committee members were also comfortable using information that openly 
discussed the principles of policy. Rather than only making technical decisions, 
politicians believed that making judgements that openly considered social values was 
congruent with their professional identity. The reliance on public information thus 
complemented their concern with how decisions would reflect upon social values. As the 
committee states: 
A decade of debate has brought the subject of pension reform to a stage where most of the 
issues have been clarified, the problems posed, and the available evidence assembled. 
Agreement has not been reached. More discussion will not help views to converge. It is our 
job, in the light of testimony and advice we have received, to suggest how to adapt present 
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institutions to significant social, cultural and economic changes. To do this we have to 
make political judgements…(emphasis added, Frith 1983, 4) 
The job of politicians is to interpret the public will, to look ahead to goals appropriate for 
the future, and – in the face of conflicting advice and contending interests to make 
judgements as to what is now acceptable and feasible to move towards these goals. That 
was our approach to examining Canada's retirement income system and to this report. 
(Frith 1983, 9) 
   
 For the Frith committee the public hearings were thus the primary means to attain 
this important information from the public. In contrast to the Haley commission, the Frith 
committee viewed the public hearings as representative of the public itself, and not 
merely “interested parties”. Committee members repeatedly spoke of the important 
function that the public hearings and the participation of grass-roots organizations played 
in identifying the concerns of Canadians (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 31:82-83; 31: 131; 
31:85; 34:11): 
I just want to say that we know that many groups in this country who have given 
presentations to the task force have a lot of resources at their command…As committee 
members, we appreciate the work that goes into this when you do not have the kind of 
resource back-up. Believe you me…their work in a very significant way gives us the grass-
roots input into pension reform which is necessary if we are to come up with a good 
political judgement on the issues. (Frith Committee Hearings 34: 20) 
 
 
 Further evidence comes from the public hearings when a committee member tells 
representatives of an interest group that “…our role is not to advance ahead of public 
opinion, but we have to have your public opinion, your comments, so we know what the 
people out there are thinking” (emphasis added, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 31:82). The 
association with the public hearings as a means to identify the interests of the public 
reflects findings of Petry (2007) that politicians view personal meetings as a primary 
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means to identify the concerns of the public as opposed to other methods such as opinion 
polls. 
 Committee members were also interested in identifying the opinions of 
individuals based on their lived experiences (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 
28:24; 11:68; 16:11; 29:69; 11:79; 16:16; 25:47-48). The individuals representing interest 
groups were not only viewed as representatives of organizations, but as persons whose 
life experiences revealed important insight. These personal experiences were as sought 
after by the committee as was the statistical evidence presented by groups during the 
Haley commission. How the Frith committee drew conclusions can be better identified by 
examining the decision-making process of specific recommendations. The 
recommendation for a homemaker pension has been selected due to the committee’s 
focus on the issue of women and pensions.  
 A key difference between the Frith committee and the Haley commission is the 
different descriptions over the nature of the problem pursuant to women and pensions. 
Whereas the expert studies of the Haley commission concluded that increasing 
participation of women in the labour force would negate gender inequalities, the 
information provided by women’s groups themselves led to different conclusions. 
Women’s groups highlighted the cultural, social and economic biases concerning 
gendered divisions of labour that continued to affect women even as they increasingly 
participated in the labour market. The issue of women and pensions thus required 
addressing the fundamental structures within the institutions of society. Speaking to the 
issue of women and pensions the committee stated: 
79 
 
To explain these facts [the exclusion of women to pensions], witnesses pointed to the 
psychological, social and institutional biases that still govern women’s choices about how 
they lead their lives…They point to what they see as biases in the pension system: the 
earnings-related nature of the C/QPP, which ignores the work women do outside the paid 
labour force… (emphasis added, Frith 1983, 73) 
  
Relying on these forms of information the committee eventually concluded: 
We do not think that the role of women as homemakers will soon disappear. It may change, 
but it will remain, and it will continue to impose constraints on the ability of women to 
enter the paid labour force… 
 …It is a problem of acknowledging and adequately providing for the work women do, 
both inside and outside the labour force, and of identifying the institutions and 
arrangements, including pension arrangements, that must be changed in order to make this 
possible. (Frith 1983, 74) 
 
Conclusion  
By categorizing the sources of information referenced in their final reports, and 
tracing the decision-making processes of the inquiries by examining their background 
studies, public hearings, media coverage, and secondary studies, it was shown that the 
experts of the Haley commission and politicians of the Frith committee solved problems 
in different ways. Seeking to identify the ‘right’ answer, the Haley commission preferred 
using expert studies. These studies were seen as providing neutral information through 
reliable methods, and when compared to the conflicting evidence gathered from public 
consultations, provided more conclusive answers. The Frith committee however was 
more wary about relying on expert studies and instead made greater use of non-expert 
information, also seen as providing insight not documented in expert studies.  
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In each case however, the preferences for varying types of information was 
complemented by other features of the inquiry. Most importantly, these were the 
background of the research directors and the nature of the research generated for the 
inquiry. These findings confirm Jenson’s (1994) claim that together, the types of research 
generated for a public inquiry, the background of the research director and the world-
view of the commissioners, shape the final recommendations eventually adopted. How 
these factors impacted the final recommendations was especially apparent concerning the 
issue of women and pensions. 
 Relying on different types of information fundamentally affected the committee’s 
recommendations. Focusing on the issue of women and pensions, it was shown that using 
non-expert information led to greater focus on the structural biases within society facing 
women that went unacknowledged by the Haley commission. Without presenting their 
evidence through economic modeling, the information presented by women’s groups was 
labelled as outside the definition of ‘good data’. The restricted criteria by which the 
Haley commission judged information thus served as the ultimate “gate keeper” (Jenson 
1994), limiting the participation of non-experts. 
 Due to the Frith committee’s reliance on non-expert information from the public, 
it is not surprising that the actions of actors within society are another factor explaining 
its final recommendations. With respect to recommendations for a homemaker pension, 
the next chapter focuses on the social learning amongst women’s groups during the 




Chapter Seven: Social Learning amongst Women’s Groups 
Introduction 
 The Frith committee’s reliance on non-expert information gave public groups an 
enhanced opportunity to meaningfully participate in policy discussions. Providing an 
opportunity however, is far from securing that one’s participation will influence the final 
recommendations. Another key factor leading to the Frith committee’s reframing of 
pensions as an issue of gender equity was the social learning amongst women’s groups 
across Canada during the Great Pension Debate. Developments included: a greater 
number of women’s groups studying the issue; an increased volume of information from 
a gendered perspective; better specified positions for reform; and a greater degree of 
consensus around such proposals. 
 These changes amongst women’s groups can be traced to the character of the 
Great Pension Debate. The federal nature of debate provided a stream of opportunities for 
groups to participate in policy discussions in an assortment of public inquiries, seminars 
and conferences, established by federal and provincial governments. Women’s groups 
built upon the information developed at consecutive venues and were better prepared for 
each ensuing round of discussions. In this sense the Haley commission and the Frith 
committee were two microcosms of learning at opposing temporal ends (see Table 1 page 
8) of a period of macro social learning. To better understand the learning amongst 
women’s groups during this time, a brief overview of the women’s movement in Canada 




Three means to gender equality  
 The women’s movement in Canada is recognised as occurring in two waves; the 
first beginning in 1880 (Phillips 1991) and the second emerging in the 1960s (for a more 
detailed discussion see, Black 1993; Adamson et al. 1988). Although rooted in concerns 
of gender inequalities, the second wave contained three factions diverging in the policy 
instruments seen as best addressing gender inequality. Vickers et al. (1993) refer to these 
blocs as “feminisms of equality”, “feminisms of difference” and “feminisms of 
androgyny” (outlined in Table 7) (see Adamson et al. 1988, 30-31 for a differing 
classification).  
 As shown in Table 7, feminisms of equality and feminisms of androgyny shared a 
common belief in the equality of women to men and a focus on changing societal 
institutions. For feminisms of difference however, women and men were fundamentally 
distinct, and the structures most in need of reform were the gender construction of the 
male and the patriarchal family. The federal nature of the Great Pension Debate provided 
continuous opportunities for these factions to discuss pensions, eventually leading to 
















(Based on the typology outlined in Vickers et al. 1993, 250) 
 
Increase in size 
 The first inclination that women’s groups had become more developed in the 
period between the Haley commission and the Frith committee is noted in a discussion 
between committee member Flora Macdonald and the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare, Monique Bégin: 
Bégin: Well, it is not bad that there is a parliamentary committee today [as opposed to 
earlier]…Lots of work has been done, and you [the committee] have benefited from that 
work that was been done by others in the sense that people are ready to come to the 
committee with briefs now; many, many groups. There is not a women’s group in the 
country that does not have a committee on pensions now. 
Macdonald: Well I recognize that the minister must have been speaking to many different 
groups than I have been speaking to, because those groups, those women’s groups, were 
ready three years ago and a lot of them were ready to go. 
Bégin: Oh that is not true. Not three years ago. There was not a women’s group ready on 
pensions, I am sorry. 
MacDonald: I want to tell the minister that indeed they were, and I have been talking to 
them just as much as the minister. 
Bégin: I should provide you with the list of moneys we paid to women’s groups in the 
country, and the dates; a little money to have seminars, get organized, obtain consultants, 































to help them understand what it is all about, because we never discussed that [i.e. 
pensions] before in women’s groups…(emphasis added, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 1:33-
34) 
  
 The dispute over whether the preceding three years had seen increased capacity of 
women’s groups to participate in formal discussions on pension reform is an empirical 
question, and can be examined in three ways. First, did the federal government increase 
expenditure on women’s groups? Secondly, did many of the women’s groups presenting 
before the Frith committee emerge after the Haley Commission? Thirdly, was there an 
increase in the production of knowledge by women’s groups?  
Findings indicate that between 1977 and 1982, there was a small increase in 
government funding for women’s groups. Funding was primarily provided by programs 
created in the 1970s designed for furthering women’s interests, referred to by Stetson and 
Mazur (1995) as “state feminism”. Within Canada these structures included: the Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women (established in 1973), and the Minister 
Responsible for the Status of Women (established in 1971) (Findlay 1987).
10
 Programs 
administered by these bodies included the Women’s Program (established in 1974 under 
the Department of Secretary of State) and the National Welfare Grants Program 
(established in 1952 under the Department of National Health and Welfare) (Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada 1982).  
                                                          
10
 The establishment of state feminism in Canada should not be equated with a government that was more 
sympathetic to adopt policies reflecting the concerns of women. Instead, despite the establishment of these 
programs and funding agencies, the concerns of women continued to face opposition and be ignored by the 
federal government. This is evidenced in the Liberal Party’s opposition to recommendations made by the 
CACSW and the NAC (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 23:123), as well as comments made by the Minister 
Responsible for the Status of Women (Judy Erola), stating the independence of these bodies as well as her 
own reservations over their specific positions on pension reform (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 15:4). For an 
overview of such resistance by the government also see Sue Findlay 1987; Louise Chappell 2005. 
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In particular, the Women’s Program funded federal, provincial and municipal 
non-governmental groups to organize and to study social policy from a gendered 
perspective (Findlay 1987, 37-39; Geller-Schwartz 1995, 45). Using expenditures 
published in the government’s public accounts, Table 8 shows that expenditure under the 
Secretary of State via the Status of Women and the Advisory Council on the Status of 
Women did increase from 1977 to 1982. In constant 1975 dollars, total funding in the 
fiscal year of 1976-77 was $889 000, while five years later in 1982-83, funding increased 
to $1 870 000.   
 
Table 8: Secretary of State Expenditure on Women’s Groups, 1976 -1982 (Constant 
$ 1975, in 1000s) 
 
 Status of Women/ Advisory Council on 




1978-79 523/530 (1 053) 
1979-80 488/556 (1 044) 
1980-81 724/941 (1 665) 
1981-82 667/958 (1 625) 
1982-83 712/ 1 158 (1 870) 
* Status of Women and the Advisory Council on the Status of Women were listed as the same 
budgetary item.  
(Source:  Public Accounts 1975/76 - 1982/83). 
  
 The objective of the National Welfare Grants Program was to fund projects by 
public organizations and academic researchers studying social welfare. While studying 
issues related to gender was not the exclusive purpose of the program, it did nonetheless 
fund such projects. Unfortunately, official public accounts do not specify spending on the 
National Welfare Grants Program and instead expenditures are identified through the 
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annual reports of the Department of National Health and Welfare. Although reports are 
not available for the years 1980-1983, the data indicates no increases in funding (Table 
9).  
 
Table 9: National Welfare Grants Expenditure (Grants for Voluntary 
Organizations) 
 
Years  Constant $1975 
1975-76 3 739 843 (831 000) 
1976-77 3 759 869 (789 673) 
1977-78 3 814 146 (938 170) 
1978-79 2 622 461 (861 960) 
1979-80  2 489 846 (901 025) 
1980-81 NA 
1981-82 NA 




The same annual reports however, indicate that projects with a gendered 
perspective became increasingly targeted for funding in the latter half of the 1970s (Table 
10, emphasized by the use of bold). 
 
 
Table 10: National Welfare Grants Targeted Research Activities 
 
Year Targeted Issues  
1975-76 Private child care, foster parent motivation, 
nuclear family in English and French milieu, 
changing role of women. 
1976-77 Aged, separation counselling, social service 
manpower and rehabilitation manpower. 
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1977-78 Child abuse, child and family welfare, the 
effects of welfare retrenchment, family 
violence 
1978-79 The aged, single parent families, family life, 
unmarried mothers, the handicapped, child 
welfare, the changing role of women, 
teaching homemakers, teen families. 
1979-80 The aged evaluation of programs, the 
handicapped, development of new policy 
instruments, family relations, family 
networks, child care systems, single 
parenthood, sole support mothers, 
assisting national conferences on the 
family and programs for women. 
(Source: Department of National Health and Welfare Annual Reports 1975-1982). 
 
What is more, this government funding is traced to the formation of women’s 
groups appearing before the Frith committee. During the public hearings, many groups 
acknowledged that they had only recently begun studying pensions within the last two 
years, in part facilitated by federal grants used to organize pension seminars (for 
example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 25:37; 9:32). For instance, during one session the 
Chair noted that the issue of women and pensions appeared to be discussed more than 
any other subject (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 29:66). This comment proceeded 
statements from the Women’s Bureau of the Canadian Labour Congress that the 
protracted nature of discussions over the last few years had “made it possible to clear up a 
number of questions and it has given some people the opportunity to express themselves 
on this matter” (Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 29:65). This effect is further indicated in 
Table 11, showing an increase in number of women’s groups appearing at the Frith 
committee than at the Haley commission. Furthermore, Table 12 shows that at least ten 
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organizations appearing before the Frith committee were founded after the establishment 
of the Haley commission (indicated by the use of bold). In sum, the number of 
organizations and individuals studying pensions from a gendered perspective did increase 
between Haley commission and the Frith committee. 
 
Table 11: Number (and Percentage) of Submissions Received by the Inquiries 
 Frith Committee Haley Commission 
Business 69 (.13) 29 (.07) 
Labour 72 (.14) 47 (.12) 
Government 27 (.05) 3 (.01) 
Experts 41 (.08) 21 (.05) 
Plan Sponsor 6 (.01) 5 (.01) 
Senior/Pensioner 40 (.08) 6 (.01) 
Women’s Groups 69 (.13) 11 (.03) 
Individuals 172 (.33) 263 (.65) 
Other 27 (.05) 15 (.04) 
Total 523 (1.0) 399 (1.0) 
 
 
Table 12:  Women’s Groups Submissions and Presentations 
 Haley Commission Frith 
Committee 
Established 
Association of Women 
Executives 
X  1976 
Canadian Advisory Council on 
the Status of Women 
X X 1973 
Business and Professional 
Women's Clubs of Ontario 
X X 1930 
Canadian Federation of 
University Women 
X X 1920 
Ontario Committee on the 
Status of Women 
X X 1971 




Y.W.C.A. of Metropolitan 
Toronto 
X X 1873 
Association des Femmes 
Collaboratrices 
 X 1980 
Association Feminine 
d'Education Sociale 
 X 1966 
Business and Professional 
Women's Clubs of BC and 
Yukon 
 X 1930 
Canadian Federation of 
Business and Professional 
Women's Clubs 
 X 1930 
Canadian Research Institute for 
the Advancement of Women
  
 X 1976 
Congress of Black Women of 
Canada 
 X 1980 
Congress of Canadian Women  X 1950 
Canadian Federation of 
University Women 
 X 1919 
Canadian Labour Congress, 
Equality of Opportunity and 
Treatment of Women 
Committee  
 X 1976 
Catholic Women's League of 
Canada 
 X 1920 
Corner Brook Status of Women 
Council  
 X 1975 
Federal PC Women's Caucus 
of Winnipeg 
 X 1980 
Federated Women's Institutes  X 1919 
Federation de femmes du 
Quebec 
 X 1966 




Manitoba Action Committee on 
the Status of Women 
 X 1967 
Manitoba Advisory  Council 
on the status of Women
  
 X 1980 
Montreal Council of Women  X 1893 
National Action Committee on 
the Status of Women 
 X 1971 
Nanaimo Council of Women  X 1919 
National Association of 
Women and the Law 
 X 1975 
National Council of Women of 
Canada 
 X 1893 
National Women's Liberal 
Commission 
 X 1928 
Native Women's Association of 
the NWT 
 X 1974 
NB advocacy council on the 
Status of Women 
 X 1977 
NS advisory council on the 
status of women 
 X 1977 
Ottawa Business & 
Professional Women's Club
  
 X 1933 
PEI Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women 
 X 1975 
Provincial Advisory Council 
of the Status of Women NL 
 X 1980 
Regina Business and 
Professional Women's club
  
 X 1933 
Regina Women's Network  X 1981 
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St. Andrews West Parish 
Catholic Women's League 
 X 1962 
YWCA (Winnipeg)   X 1886 
YWCA (Halifax)  X 1874 
Saskatchewan Coalition for 
Women’s Pensions 
 X 1979 
Sudbury Women's Action 
Committee on Pension 
Reform 
 X 1980 
Sudbury Business and 
Professional Women's Club 
 X 1945 
Toronto Area Caucus of 
Women and Law 
 X 1970 
Federation des associations des 
famillies monoparentales de 
Quebec 
 X 1974 
University of Calgary, Status of 
Women Committee 
 X 1976 
University Women's Club of 
Edmonton 
 X 1982 
University Women's Club of 
Etobicoke 
 X 1952 
University Women's Club of 
North York 
 X 1951 
University Women's Club of 
South Delta 
 X 1966 
University Women's Club of 
Vancouver  
 X 1907 
University Women's Club of 
Winnipeg  
 X 1909 
ZONTA International  X 1919 
ZONTA club of Halifax  X 1919 
Vancouver Status of Women  X 1972 
(Only those groups whose date of origins could be verified are displayed) 
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Increase in research and analysis  
 While funding was associated with an increase in the number of women’s groups 
studying pensions, this did not equate with the ability of every group to conduct a 
technical analysis of pensions. As mentioned in chapter six, discussions of pensions by 
women’s groups during both the Haley commission and the Frith committee were 
generally limited to non-technical matters. During the Frith committee a total of 22 
women’s groups explicitly mentioned that a lack of resources or technical understanding 
had hindered their participation. For example, the Vancouver Status of Women stated:  
 
One of the problems with coming before the task force is that we are not actuarial 
accountants, and to develop a brief means that most of us have to study this at length. It is 
quite an intimidating topic, taking on pensions, even listening to the proceedings of the task 
force is intimidating.  So what I think will happen is that you will probably not be hearing 
from many women’s organizations who have definite opinions on the subject, because they 
do not feel themselves confident enough to prepare a brief or to sit before the task force. I 
know it was a major undertaking for our organization to decide to do it and then to sit 
down and teach ourselves the complexities of pensions and alternatives. Frankly, there are 
parts of the green paper that are still incomprehensible to me. They are in English, but I do 
not know quite what they are saying. (Frith Committee Hearings 24:45) 
  
 However, the inability to produce technical information was not a trait of all 
women’s groups. For some larger organizations in existence before the Haley 
commission, the period between 1977 and 1982, resulted in increased technical research. 
Such analysis used economic, statistical, actuarial, and legal information to complement 
insights drawn from lived experiences. 
Using several databases, including the Canadian Research Index, Canadian Public 
Policy Collection, Google Scholar and government search engines, Table 13, identifies 
the number of documents addressing pensions in Canada from a gendered perspective. 
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Noting mentions by some organizations during the public hearings to forthcoming studies 
not yet published, the span of the search is extended to include works published in 1983. 
The results show that between 1979 and 1983 the number of studies examining pensions 
from a gendered perspective increased by more than 300 percent.  
 


























 (Terms searched: Women* AND Pension*; Pension* AND Homemaker*). 
  
 Two organizations producing these technical studies were the National Action 
Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), and the Canadian Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women (CACSW). Examples of the most prominent works included the 
CACSW’s “Pension Reform with Women in Mind” (1981) prepared by Louise Dulude, 
and the NAC’s “Women and Pensions” (1981).  
These studies examined the gendered assumptions within the structures of pension 
policy, the economy, and society more generally, while outlining possible alternatives of 
reforms. Recognizing the technical nature of pension discussions, these documents were 
also designed to increase the participation of women in such discussions. As stated in 
1981 by the CACSW (produced by Louise Dulude): 
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Until now, few of these issues [the inadequacies of the pension system] have been 
intelligently discussed in Canada because women have not yet fully entered the pension 
debate. One of the main barriers to their doing so has been that discussions of these 
subjects are too often obscured by impenetrable jargon. It is very difficult to keep in mind 
that pension reform is primarily a women's issue when the most knowledgeable people in 
the field are actuaries and economists (almost all male) who speak a language that is 
unintelligible to all but the most faithful readers of financial pages. The goal of the present 
report is to feminize the Great Canadian Pension Debate. (1981, 2) 
 
 Armed with these reports bringing together economic, statistical and actuarial 
analysis, alongside knowledge from the lived experiences of women, the NAC and the 
CACSW eventually became recognized during the early 1980s as serious pension policy 
analysts by actors inside and outside the women’s movement (McKeen 2001, 49).11 
  
Federalism, time and social learning: specification and consensus for a homemaker 
pension 
 Alongside growth in the number of studies and groups studying pensions from a 
gendered perspective, the period between 1977 and 1982 also led to greater specification 
and consensus around programs of reform, and in particular around the idea of a 
homemaker pension. The ongoing creation by federal and provincial governments of 
public forums provided the opportunity for women’s groups to organize, develop, diffuse 
and reflect upon research. Women’s groups thus developed more specified proposals for 
reform, and worked to develop consensus amongst the different positions held by groups 
adhering to principles of feminisms of difference and feminisms of equality.  
                                                          
11
  According to an interview with Robert Baldwin who participated in the NPC in 1981, as well as the 




 One reason why the federalist character of the Great Pension Debate led to more 
specified positions with great consensus was the ability of groups to build upon past 
studies produced during previous events of the Great Pension Debate. Figure 3 displays 
the sources of information referenced by women’s groups during Frith committee’s 
public hearings. The findings show that studies recently produced by women’s groups 
were frequently used to develop present proposals. The work of the NAC was of 
particular importance, whose submission to the committee was so familiar it was simply 
called the “Pink Paper” by those within and outside the women’s movement (for 
example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 29:63). Other important works commonly cited 
during the hearings was research produced by the Canadian Labour Congress, Monica 
Townson and Louise Dulude. 
How women’s groups used past studies created during the first half of the Great 
Pension Debate to better prepare their positions is also identified during the public 
hearings of the Frith committee. For example, when asked a technical question on 
pension plan funding, a representative of the Provincial Advisory Council on the Status 
of Women in Newfoundland and Labrador stated that: “We have not done an analysis of 
it [the true economic costs of plan contributions], because we do not have the expertise, 








Figure 3: Referenced Sources by Women’s Groups, Frith Public Hearings 
 
In contrast to being able to use these studies prepared during the Great Pension 
Debate, during the Haley commission, groups lacked such information. By being one of 
the first forums calling attention to pensions during this era, women’s groups had little 
previous studies to rely upon and only three months from the call for proposals until 
submissions were due. Women’s groups before the commission thus frequently presented 
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preliminary findings drawn from ongoing studies only begun once the Haley commission 
was established (for example, Haley 1981, Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of 
Women, Cassette 38).  
The plurality of venues during the Great Pension Debate also contributed to the 
increased specification of proposals for reform. How the policy ideas amongst women’s 
groups became better specified is identified by examining some of the most frequently 
cited studies by women’s groups. Two documents saliently referred to by groups before 
the Frith committee, “Pension Reform with Women in Mind” (1981) authored by Louise 
Dulude and commissioned by the CACSW and “Women and Pensions” (1981) prepared 
by the NAC. These documents provide detailed analysis of the final reports of past policy 
reviews of the Great Pension Debate (including the Haley commission),
12
 both criticizing 
their proposed recommendations and pointing out alternatives for future reforms.  
Benefiting from the ability to learn from the past, Dulude’s (1981) report outlines 
the most common proposals for reform that had been presented by women’s groups. 
Within these discussions the idea of a homemaker pension was noted as an increasingly 
important issue and a likely solution that would be acceptable to several differing groups 
(1981, 67-94): 
‘Pensions for Housewives’ has been a popular rallying cry in the last few years and an 
increasingly ‘hot’ issue among women’s groups. Except for the general principle that 
homemakers deserve some personal financial recognition in old age, however, there is as 
yet no consensus on the form such pensions should take. (1981, 59) 
   
                                                          
12
 Dulude discusses the findings of the Haley commission at length; this is also discussed by the CACSW 
(1981, Appendix 7, 1-4; also see NAC 1981, 1-4), 
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Activities fostering dialogue amongst different women’s groups also took place in 
public forums, including the National Pensions Conference (NPC), in the spring of 1981. 
According to Freda Paltiel, a head member of the Status of Women Canada during the 
1970s and early 1980s, the establishment of the NPC helped foster interest in the subject 
of pensions by women’s groups. Paltiel identifies no less than 37 seminars bringing 
together over 3 000 women in the follow-up to the NPC (1982, 342). In fact, during the 
Frith committee’s public hearings many women’s groups identified the NAC’s 
discussions as the place where their positions on pensions were developed, including the 
idea a homemaker pension (for example, Frith 1983, Public Hearings, 36:27; 34:19; 5:36; 
30:87; 23:123; 25:42; 9:32; 9:44). In this manner, the ongoing public venues between 
1977 and 1982 served to create the conditions where the idea of a homemaker pension 
was ‘softened-up’ (Kingdon 2011) amongst women’s groups. 
 How the concept of a homemaker pension developed from a vague concept on the 
periphery of discussions into a more specific proposal is evidenced in discussions within 
the National Action Committee on the Status of Women – the largest umbrella 
organization within the Canadian women’s movement. When the NAC first debated the 
idea of a homemaker pension in 1976, many groups remained uncertain over their 
specific position (for examples of such uncertainty during the Haley commission see the 
Ontario Committee on the Status of Women in Haley 1978, Public Hearings, Cassette 6; 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Cassette 38). Of the 27 delegates 
participating in the final vote on the issue, three voted in favour, six opposed and 
eighteen reserved from taking a position (Vickers 1993, 261). 
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 As the pension discussions continued to unfold however, the idea of a homemaker 
pension, and the idea of ‘wages for housework’ more broadly, continued to be discussed 
and debated within the NAC (Vickers et al. 1993, 107, 258). Disagreements persisted 
between some groups who felt that awarding pension benefits to homemakers was a 
regressive move that would encourage women to remain within the home, and others who 
maintained that domestic work possessed economic value that ought to be recognized. An 
example of the latter view was articulated by Dulude in 1981: 
If women ruled the world, Canada's pensions would certainly be very different from what 
they are today. For example, we could have a system where important work such as child 
care, education and social services gave entitlement to government pensions, while more 
frivolous activities such as making widgets and money did not. (1981, 41) 
  
 As discussions continued, points of difference became better identified, as did 
possible alternatives for compromise. Increasingly, a homemaker pension was identified 
by a majority of groups as one viable policy alternative for reform. While differences 
over the ideal vision of gender equality persisted, the proposal for a homemaker pension 
became agreed upon for differing reasons. For some, a homemaker pension was a means 
to recognize the economic value of domestic labour. For others, although a homemaker 
pension was seen as preventing the emancipation of women from the private sphere, the 
idea became accepted as a means to help women nearing retirement without any accrued 
benefits (Vickers et al. 1993, 261). Accordingly, at the NAC’s general meeting in 1980, a 
resolution was adopted in favour of a homemaker pension (Vickers et al. 1993, 261).  
 The increased specification and consensus for a homemaker pension during the 
Great Pension Debate is lastly measured by comparing the percentage of women’s groups 
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advocating for a homemaker pension appearing before the Haley commission and the 
Frith committee. Figure 4 shows that a larger percentage of the organizations appearing 
before the Frith committee supported the idea of a homemaker pension than during the 
Haley commission. 
During the Haley commission four of seven groups (57 percent) were in favour of 
a homemaker pension, whereas during the Frith committee 15 of 23 (65 percent) 
officially expressed their support for the idea.
13
  
Figure 4: Support for a Homemaker Pension 
 
(Haley N = 7;  Frith N = 23) 
 Furthermore, amongst those groups supporting the idea of a homemaker pension, 
there was a greater degree of consensus over specific proposals for reform during the 
Frith committee than during the Haley commission. Shown in Figure 5, 50 percent of 
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 The Frith committee’s results are a conservative measurement. Some groups mentioned their support for 
the idea during the public hearings, yet refrained from making their support official, due to what they 
considered were difficulties of implementing such ideas during the ongoing economic recession (Frith 















groups supporting a homemaker pension at the Haley commission did not have any 
specific idea as to how such an idea could be implemented (also see Haley 1978, Public 
Hearings, Cassette 6). 
 In contrast, during the Frith committee, 66 percent of groups agreed on specific 
mechanisms of reform, i.e. CPP contributions generated from a mix of general tax 
revenues and other home income earners. 
 




  Women’s groups during the Frith committee were thus more familiar with the 
concept of a homemaker pension. Familiarity with the different technical proposals for a 




















committee, many women’s groups discussed the idea of a homemaker pension by 
comparing their positions against those of others. As stated by an economist from 
Université du Québec à Montréal and representative of the Fédération des Associations 
des Familles Monoparentales du Québec during the committee’s hearings: 
I think most of the women’s groups think something must be done for homemakers. But 
this is a relatively new issue…This question on homemakers’ pensions has been discussed 
for about two years now; therefore there are a number of proposals on the table. Different 
women’s groups have different opinions. (36:56) 
   
Conclusion 
 Between 1977 and 1982 there was an increased interest amongst women’s groups 
in pension policy. When the Frith committee sat just two years after the final report of the 
Haley commission, the number of women’s groups studying pensions was larger, better 
resourced, and possessed more articulate positions. An important factor contributing to 
the social learning of these groups was the federal character of the Great Pension Debate. 
By creating a succession of public venues for debate women’s groups were able to build 
upon recent findings and discussions. This led to better specified positions and greater 
consensus for reform around the idea of a homemaker pension. In short, while some have 
noted that a unitary public inquiry can encourage learning amongst the public (for 
example, Iacobucci 1990), the federal nature of the Great Pension Debate created a 






Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
Key findings 
 The origin of this work began with a desire to better understand the factors 
affecting how governments learn. Noting the use of policy reviews to study problems and 
develop solutions, this work focused on explaining the differing recommendations of two 
public inquiries studying the same issue, within the same country and during the same 
time period.  
 By examining the final reports, background papers, public hearings, media 
coverage and secondary sources written by persons involved in the two inquiries, the 
variation in the recommendations were explained by: (a) the types of information used by 
the members of the inquiries; and (b) the social learning amongst women’s groups in the 
period between the two inquiries.  
Members of the Haley commission preferred expert information, especially 
actuarial and economic studies. This data was seen as providing neutral and reliable 
findings, and hence the best source upon which to draw recommendations. Lacking the 
methods necessary to generate ‘good data’, information from the public went unused. 
Conversely, the politicians of the Frith committee were more open to use non-expert 
information.  
Furthermore, whereas the limited view of what was considered policy relevant 
knowledge held by the Haley commission led commissioners to be dismayed with the 
quality of the public’s information, for the Frith committee, such information provided 
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important insight into issues not highlighted by expert studies, including the values and 
principles embedded in policy. 
It was also found that the preferences for different types of information held by 
the each inquiry were complemented by structural factors, specifically, the background of 
the research directors, and the types of information these directors generated.  
For the Haley commission, two actuarial experts – Laurence Coward and Keith 
Cooper – were appointed as research directors. Coward, had also been responsible for the 
research conducted for a royal commission on pensions within Ontario in 1960, past 
President of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, and former chair of the Ontario Pension 
Commission (the same position Commissioner Donna Haley had also held). Appointing 
actuarial experts to oversee the research led to the production of studies that used 
quantitative methods, and furthermore, were used to fill gaps in the existing body of 
literature. The nature of this research was thus a second component complementing the 
commissioner’s preference to use expert information. By providing novel findings and 
using advanced methods, these studies were seen as providing superior information than 
previous research. 
 In the same manner, the generation of an opinion poll to identify public opinion 
was also seen as providing new insight (via a statistically representative sample) of the 
public’s opinions. However, by identifying public opinion via a survey, the commission 
embedded within itself a view of the public as merely a sum of opinions. Moreover, the 
public hearings became seen as a forum dominated by special interests and hence 
information gathered through this medium was seen as being politically skewed. The 
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expert studies were thus all the more desirable due to their independence and lack of 
political ambitions, as much as their use of sound methods. 
The background of the research director and the types of research generated for 
the inquiry were also important factors that complemented the preference for non-expert 
information held by members of the Frith committee. Drawing upon his experience from 
academia and the civil service, research director Dobell, thought that policy analysis 
should include a range of information based on a variety of human experiences.  
 Also complementing the committee’s use of non-expert information was the 
nature of the research conducted on its behalf. Background studies relied on the body of 
research already produced. Whereas the original research for the Haley commission 
examining answers to specific questions pointed to one conclusive answer, the reliance 
on previous studies thus led to studies of synthesis that highlighted ongoing points of 
differences amongst works studying pensions. This research thus complemented the 
committee’s view that expert studies were characterized by unresolvable conflicts, and 
contributed towards its greater acceptance to use non-expert information.    
The final element complementing the Frith committee’s use of non-expert 
information was the perception that the public hearings were a means for the public, and 
not special interests, to participate in policy discussions. Seeing those appearing at the 
hearings as representatives of the public, the Frith committee had a greater respect for 
information gathered at such hearings, than was the case of the Haley commission. 
The varying ways the two inquiries incorporated information from the public thus 
supports Salter’s (2007) claim that how inquiries’ view the public varies, and that such 
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conceptions can affect the final recommendations. Policy makers using public inquiries 
as a means of increasing the participation of the public should be aware of factors likely 
affecting different conceptions of the public. Conducting public opinion polls alongside 
public hearings could cause public information to be viewed as politically skewed 
especially vis-à-vis the results of statistically representative polling. 
  
Causes of incremental and radical learning 
The findings of this thesis contribute to debates within the public inquiry literature 
over whether public inquiries generally led to radical or incremental learning. A primary 
finding has been that the radical learning of the Frith committee was due to the opening 
of policy discussions to non-experts with little previous meaningful participation. 
Conversely, by continuing to limit meaningful participation to those able to generate 
expert information (i.e. accountants, actuaries and lawyers) the Haley commission 
perpetuated the standard approach to pension policy.  
 By expanding the range of actors participating in discussions the Frith committee 
realized the potential inquiries possess to generate innovative ideas. The Frith committee 
thus became a battleground of meaning where alternative framings of issues contented for 
domination (Jenson 1994; Phillips 1994). Therefore, while this work supports research 
theorizing that politicians are more likely to broaden the range of actors in deliberations 
due to their openness to non-expert information (Garvin 2001; Radaelli 2005; Jasanoff 
and Wynne 1998), it is possible for either politicians or experts to be associated with 
innovative learning if their participation works to expand the range of actors and views in 
policy deliberations.  
107 
 
For instance, if a policy domain is dominated by specific discipline, then these 
experts could be associated with innovative ideas if there is either a paradigm shift within 
their respective field (thus expanding the range of ideas) (Hall 1993), or if the policy 
discussions are opened to experts from other disciplines (thus expanding the range of 
ideas by expanding the range of actors).  
Debates over the ability of public inquiries to generate innovative ideas, would 
thus be improved by focusing on whether its features, such as the background of the 
members, the research conducted on its behalf and the directors overseeing such research, 
serve to either expand or constrain the range of interests and ideas in policy discussions. 
 
Federalism, time and social learning 
 Another key variable explaining the Frith committee’s recommendations was the 
social learning amongst women’s groups during the Great Pension Debate. The federal 
character of the debate provided a succession of venues where women’s groups could 
expand their study of pensions by continuing to organize, produce and distribute 
information. 
When more public venues were established after the Haley commission, women’s 
groups were able to further distribute their most recent analysis and discuss alternative 
proposals for reform. This led to an enhanced understanding of pensions, and better 
specified positions. Eventually, a majority of women’s groups embraced the idea of a 
homemaker pension as a viable proposal for reform.  
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 In the end, the increased presence of groups articulating the need for a 
homemaker pension, coupled with decision-makers open to using non-expert 
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Haley Commission Frith Committee 
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Ministry of the Attorney General Department of National Health and 
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Ministry of Revenue Louise Dulude 
Geoffry Calvert, R. A. Field Status of Women 
Canadian Life Insurance Association James L. Clare 
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Ian H.D. Bovey 
Department of Justice (Harvey Lazar) Harvey Lazar 
Economic Council of Canada Economic Council of Canada 
Department of National Health and Welfare James E. Pesando 
Statistics Canada J.C. Weldon 
Dudley Funnel Anthony Wohfarth 
Canadian Labour Congress Monica Townson 
Maryin E. Segal Company (Actuarial and 
Consulting services) 
Committees and Private Legislation 
Directorate 
Superintendent of Insurance (Richard 
Humphrys) 
Privy Council Office, Task Force on 
Pension Reform 
Tomenson-Alexander Associates  
Ross Archibald, University of Western 
Ontario 
 
Watt Company, D.D. Ezra  
James P. Marshall Inc.  
Kevin Collins  
United Auto Workers  
Trust Companies Association of Canada  
Clarkson Gordon  
Benefits Policy Branch of the Civil Service 
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Wayne G. Beach, (Tax lawyer, consultant)  
 
